Date: Mon, 20 Nov 1995 07:26:16 -0800 (PST) Subject: 5:1: seminar report nb3 From: Zoe Pettit Sender: owner-emls-utopia Precedence: bulk 15 November 1995 This seminar involves a study of the Utopian state, that is, the way in which it functions, politically and socially. If we begin by taking a brief look at the origins of the island, we note that it was created and constituted by one man - King Utopus. Machiavelli, who was a contemporary of More, claimed that a state is best formed by one sole intellect,leading to unity of design. For example, Rome or Athens were both organised by men with enough prestige, charisma and authority to impose their laws and views. Let us now turn more specifically to the political and social organisation of Utopia. There are 54 cities on the island, which matches the number of counties in England and Wales at the time. City : 'civitas' in latin and 'polis' in Greek, refering to city-state. The cities are surrounded by urban countryside, reminiscent of the Greek city states and also Italian principalities or dukedoms - like Florence or Venice during the Renaissance. A city as opposed to a town has a special status ascribed to it, including a certain number of privileges and a charter. There are 6 000 families in each city, made up of families or households. Every group of thirty households is lead by a syphogrant (the original term) or phylarch (the modern equivalent utilized by More). More often gives both versions in the text and then prefers to use the more recent term. The exception to this is the name of the island itself, originally Abraxa and re-named Utopia. Abraxa originates from Egypt occultism and in old Jewish tradition signifies the highest heaven - nothing is above it. The island then becomes Utopia or 'nowhere place'. The national senate then, consists of three members from each city. Ten syphogrants elect a tranibor or head phylarch. All 200 syphogrants elect a prince from among the four men who have been nominated by the people. However there is a prince in each city, and no national executive. All is conducted through the senate which meets every year at Amaurot. So in this carefully engineered society there is a mixture of republican political thought and rationality employed. There is no text of the constitution as with Harrington's 'Oceana'. So the reader is left to re-build the scattered information. Let us now turn to the way in which the households function within this framework. All men and women learn a trade in the city before moving to the countryside to work in the fields for two years. People can be requisitioned to work in the fields for the harvest. A rotation system is thereby set up in which everybody contributes to the sustaining of the community. The inplicit criticism is against those parasites,of noble birth or members of royalty, who do not work and so live off the efforts of the working population. Idleness is considered as one of the roots to all evils and was an obsession of the period. More was one of the first statesmen who saw the need to produce legislation to cover this. In Book I and II, More presents problems and possibilities as solutions. Trade should be encouraged, idleness should be repressed and instead of hanging criminels or thieves, they should be made to work. In Utopia then, a system of labour is firmly in place. All occupations must be of use to the community, and there is a move towards an attempt at equality. Everyone wears the same dress, remaining undistinguished from their occupation. In Tudor England, people were identified by their occupation and corresponding clothing. There were laws regulating dress according to social class and ther were instances where people were fined for wearing something above their status. In More's 'Utopia' then, a certain social equality is aimed for, apart from the slaves who occupy a different rung of the ladder. People living around the cities have equal civic status with those living within the city. Yet we are aware that there is still a form of organisational hierarchy in Utopia. A class of intellectuals exist and are chosen by the priests and officers of the republic. If they do not work efficiently, they are sent back to the original craft they learned at the outset. Conversly, if a craftsman excels, he can be 'promoted to the order of learned men', becoming an intellectual worksman. To conclude this seminar then, an important question is raised. Is the most important force and focus in Utopia, national or social ? Harrington propoes that laws are an instrument protection for liberty. More's emphasis is rather on social equality as he wants eminence to arise from personal effort. Social organisation seems to be more important than constitutional politics, even though a political hierarchy does play its own role in the organisation of Utopia. ************************TIME TRIETH TRUTH************************ *e-mail: lb@alor.univ-montp3.fr - lb@bred.univ-montp3.fr *Prof. Luc Borot - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches *sur la Renaissance Anglaise *Universite Paul-Valery, Montpellier (France) *phone: 33-67142448 - 33-67142449 - fax 33-67142465 Date: Tue, 21 Nov 1995 02:59:38 -0800 (PST) From: owner-emls-utopia Subject: 5:2: Pre-seminar post nb 4 =46rom: Luc Borot Sender: owner-emls-utopia Precedence: bulk The classware seminar of next Wednesday November 22 will be devoted to the apparently paradoxical theme of reason of state in More's *Utopia*. The notion of reason of state has recently been the subject of several collective volumes in France, in the field of history of political philosophy. To those who would like to see where French research on the subject stands, I thoroughly recommend three volumes, but especially Yves Charles Zarka, ed, *Raison et deraison d'Etat* (Paris: PUF, collection =46ondements de la politique, 1994), a fat volume (over 400 pages, about 20 papers) on the history of the notion, with general studies, studies on individual authors and national currents; two volumes were edited by Dominique Reyni=E9 and Christian Lazzeri: *Le pouvoir de la raison d'Etat* and *Raison d'Etat, rationalite et politique* (Paris: PUF, 1992). Is it providence, coincidence or conspiracy? Machiavelli seems to have composed his *Prince* in 1513, according to his biographers, viz. one year before the publication of Erasmus's *Praise of Folly*, 3 years before that of More's *Utopia*. That the *Prince* was not published until several years later should not blind us to the common moment in the history of European culture, the last years of unified Western Christianity, before Luther's major writings. The 3 aforesaid books can be regarded as some of the last major masterpieces of pre-Reformation humanism. The *Prince* and *Utopia* are the fruits of the same world, written within a few years' distance by two statesmen that had in common their social origins: none was a nobleman. They are divided by their respective posterities: More the martyred saint, and Machiavelli the political preachers' devil, a.k.a. Mac-Evil. Yet the geo-political context of their works and of their actions, in two different areas of Europe, is the same. The saint is under the influence of Northern humanism, the evil one (so they say) under that of Southern humanism (and Roman clerical pragmaticism). The term 'ragione di stato' does not appear in Machiavelli, but the reality it covers is justly considered as being amply described in his writings. Machiavelli writes the *Prince* to help the new prince, the ruler of a newly acquired dominion. In a word, the political concept that the new prince must face is illegitimacy. How to become legitimate for the laws of one's dominion by practical means? If we now look at the tale told by Hytholday, we can find possible parallels with Machiavellian paradigms: what was Utopus? a conqueror. What became of the brand new names he gave to the functions of the officers of the reformed island? they are harly used at all: the people have retained the old names (except for place-names, which is one of the oddities of naming in *Utopia*, by the way). What did he first do? he had herculean works performed to isolate the place from the mainland (not machiavellian, right). Who did it? the natives *and* the conqueror's soldiers, to avoid creating a difference between the two populations. Utopus is in the situation of the new prince who comes to rule over a people of whom we don't know if they had their own laws, but who were in in a state of primitive culture. He is a civilising legislator. He 'elevates' his new subjects. This case is not considered by Machiavelli in the *Prince*, but it might be a studied as a parallel with the Roman colonies referred to in the *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*. It's always struck me that Pocock had missed something by forgetting or ommitting More from his *Machiavellian Moment*: he presents case-studies that have much in common with Machiavelli. Utopus brings a new law, but is he a prophet like Moses, or a legislator like Solon, Romulus or Lycurgus? he uses the sword to establish a perpetual government of laws. Harrington will try to solve the question of the relationship between arms and the law in the establishment of a commonwealth, in terms that will differ from More's, and from Machiavelli's too. So there seems to be parallels, common problems, though the solutions and the rhetorical strategies are vastly different. Can we agree about the definition of 'reason of state'? Laurence Pons, in her report of seminar 2, tried to sum up the definitions we established during the seminar. Let us try to refine on this very complex concept. Bodin, in book 1 of his *Six livres de la r=E9publique* (1576), defines what he calls 'la censure' as the means to know the state of the country by a complete census, in order to conceive a policy on solid material information. This is one of the two definitions given by Botero in his *Ragion' di Stato*. Harrington will be close to that definition. The most frequent use of the notion of reason of State, and the one that most calls to mind the Florentine secretary, is the suspension of the fundamental ethical rules of the State to face exceptional conditions. The persistence of the State is the end that justifies the means; the means involve the (hopefully) momentary suspension of moral values in the government of the country. 'Comite de Salut Public' in the French Revolution, the possibility of granting the President the 'pleins pouvoirs' by a vote of Parliament in the constitution of the 5th Republic in France, are opposite instances in French history: the latter introduces a constitutional device to give the ruler the right to suspend the ordinary course of governing 'pro tempore'. The institution of the 'dictator' in the Roman republic, with Cincinnatus, is a classical instance of this kind of provision that defines how far a State can suspend the rules it provides its members with as paradigms of behaviour. Two examples of suspension of principles in the commonwealth of Utopia: money and colonial conquest. The topic of money has already been mentioned in a previous posting, a couple of weeks ago, so my suggestions for this week will focus on warfare, but since money is the sinews of war, well... In fact, what my earlier post dealing with money discussed was the way the utopians dealt with the social *value* of precious metals and stones. The use of money and violence has to do with reason of state because: 1/ mercenaries are used whenever the involvement of Utopians can be avoided (one of my history teachers used to say that the British fought Napoleon to their last Austrian, but this is France...); 2/ when war has started, or is about to start, money can buy enemy officers or soldiers to betray their side. There may be other points, but these illustrate my point. Sincerity and honesty prevail at home, but peace at home justifies the means. There is a price to pay for equality: 'some' reduction of freedom, as Zoe Pettit reminded us in her recent report. In messages 5:3 and 5:4, I am sending you the Latin and English versions of the passages on war on which I'd like your observations. You will certainly notice in the text that Hythloday (and the Utopians) insist of their attachment to moral values in case of international conflicts. They first try to avoid war by corruption (immoral) or diplomacy, then they try to use mercenaries, if there are not enough of them, they will then send their own men... and women... and children. They will go to war to avenge allies, partners, and last only themselves. They want to punish the offenders and spare the innocent. Yet this implies resorting to spying and public denounciation. Without their spies, i.e. traitors to their own countries, they could not protect their own citizens from the hazards of warfare. I am shocked by the military practice of having husband, wife and children fighting side by side. Plato (Republic, V, 466e-467a) and Tacitus (Germany) are the source, according to Logan, Adams and Miller. In Plato, the children are taken to war by their parents, who are in charge of warfare, in the division of labour prevalent in that polis. The purpose is to train the children to their future trade. In More, it is an incentive for the father to fight to death. Does this really fit the classical humanist views on 'just war' and on education? Are the other tricks used by the Utopians quite acceptable by More, if we consider that he was very present as author in Hythloday's criticism of counsellors in Bk 1? I am keen to read your reactions on these points... and others. Concerning colonial matters, the problem is the exportation of their model of society. You will find this at an earlier stage in the text of book 2, under the heading 'De commerciis mutuis' or 'Of their Traffic'. When the island gets too populated, they ask volunteers to create a colony on the mainland, on uncultivated territory; if the natives accept to live with them under their laws, they are integrated, and the 2 peoples merge, but in case of refusal, they wage war because it is a case of warfare to leave lands barren. What do you think of this self-righteousness in foreign policy? This is a very long posting, but the issues are very serious indeed. Please flood the list with your comments: I find this e-seminar pretty passive, which is disappointing indeed for us at EMLS. Indeed, a seminar --virtual or otherwise-- lives of its participants' involvement, so post, criticise, argue, react, but make it LIVE! Yours, Luc Borot **********************TIME TRIETH TRUTH********************* Luc Borot home 33-67 52 07 98 fax 33-67 14 24 65 work 33-67 14 24 49/33-67 14 24 48 Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Renaissance Anglaise Universite Paul Valery --- Montpellier (France) Date: Tue, 21 Nov 1995 03:00:49 -0800 (PST) Subject: 5:4: English text on war From: Luc Borot Sender: owner-emls-utopia Precedence: bulk A note on this text: it is the wiretap-OTA text. I have introduced paragraphs to match the Latin text sent as message 5:3 on emls-utopia, according to the new Cambridge edition by Logan, Adams and Miller, with Latin text and English translation (CUP, 1995). Of Their Military Discipline 1. THEY detest war as a very brutal thing; and which, to the reproach of human nature, is more practised by men than by any sort of beasts. They, in opposition to the sentiments of almost all other nations, think that there is nothing more inglorious than that glory that is gained by war. And therefore though they accustom themselves daily to military exercises and the discipline of war -in which not only their men but their women likewise are trained up, that in cases of necessity they may not be quite useless -yet they do not rashly engage in war, unless it be either to defend themselves, or their friends, from any unjust aggressors; or out of good-nature or in compassion assist an oppressed nation in shaking off the yoke of tyranny. They indeed help their friends, not only in defensive, but also in offensive wars; but they never do that unless they had been consulted before the breach was made, and being satisfied with the grounds on which they went, they had found that all demands of reparation were rejected, so that a war was unavoidable. This they think to be not only just, when one neighbor makes an inroad on another, by public order, and carry away the spoils; but when the merchants of one country are oppressed in another, either under pretence of some unjust laws, or by the perverse wresting of good ones. This they count a juster cause of war than the other, because those injuries are done under some color of laws. 2. This was the only ground of that war in which they engaged with the Nephelogetes against the Aleopolitanes, a little before our time; for the merchants of the former having, as they thought, met with great injustice among the latter, which, whether it was in itself right or wrong, drew on a terrible war, in which many of their neighbors were engaged; and their keenness in carrying it on being supported by their strength in maintaining it, it not only shook some very flourishing States, and very much afflicted others, but after a series of much mischief ended in the entire conquest and slavery of the Aleopolitanes, who though before the war they were in all respects much superior to the Nephelogetes, were yet subdued; but though the Utopians had assisted them in the war, yet they pretended to no share of the spoil. 3. But though they so vigorously assist their friends in obtaining reparation for the injuries they have received in affairs of this nature, yet if any such frauds were committed against themselves, provided no violence was done to their persons, they would only on their being refused satisfaction forbear trading with such a people. This is not because they consider their neighbors more than their own citizens; but since their neighbors trade everyone upon his own stock, fraud is a more sensible injury to them than it is to the Utopians, among whom the public in such a case only suffers. As they expect nothing in return for the merchandise they export but that in which they so much abound, and is of little use to them, the loss does not much affect them; they think therefore it would be too severe to revenge a loss attended with so little inconvenience, either to their lives or their subsistence, with the death of many persons; but if any of their people is either killed or wounded wrongfully, whether it be done by public authority or only by private men, as soon as they hear of it they send ambassadors, and demand that the guilty persons may be delivered up to them; and if that is denied, they declare war; but if it be complied with, the offenders are condemned either to death or slavery. 4. They would be both troubled and ashamed of a bloody victory over their enemies, and think it would be as foolish a purchase as to buy the most valuable goods at too high a rate. And in no victory do they glory so much as in that which is gained by dexterity and good conduct, without bloodshed. In such cases they appoint public triumphs, and erect trophies to the honor of those who have succeeded; for then do they reckon that a man acts suitably to his nature when he conquers his enemy in such a way as that no other creature but a man could be capable of, and that is by the strength of his understanding. Bears, lions, boars, wolves, and dogs, and all other animals employ their bodily force one against another, in which as many of them are superior to men, both in strength and fierceness, so they are all subdued by his reason and understanding. 5. The only design of the Utopians in war is to obtain that by force, which if it had been granted them in time would have prevented the war; or if that cannot be done, to take so severe a revenge on those that have injured them that they may be terrified from doing the like for the time to come. By these ends they measure all their designs, and manage them so that it is visible that the appetite of fame or vainglory does not work so much on them as a just care of their own security. 6. As soon as they declare war, they take care to have a great many schedules, that are sealed with their common seal, affixed in the most conspicuous places of their enemies' country. This is carried secretly, and done in many places all at once. In these they promise great rewards to such as shall kill the prince, and lesser in proportion to such as shall kill any other persons, who are those on whom, next to the prince himself, they cast the chief balance of the war. And they double the sum to him that, instead of killing the person so marked out, shall take him alive and put him in their hands. They offer not only indemnity, but rewards, to such of the persons themselves that are so marked, if they will act against their countrymen; by this means those that are named in their schedules become not only distrustful of their fellow-citizens but are jealous of one another, and are much distracted by fear and danger; for it has often fallen out that many of them, and even the Prince himself, have been betrayed by those in whom they have trusted most; for the rewards that the Utopians offer are so unmeasurably great, that there is no sort of crime to which men cannot be drawn by them. They consider the risk that those run who undertake such services, and offer a recompense proportioned to the danger; not only a vast deal of gold, but great revenues in lands, that lie among other nations that are their friends, where they may go and enjoy them very securely; and they observe the promises they make of this kind most religiously. 7. They very much approve of this way of corrupting their enemies, though it appears to others to be base and cruel; but they look on it as a wise course, to make an end of what would be otherwise a long war, without so much as hazarding one battle to decide it. They think it likewise an act of mercy and love to mankind to prevent the great slaughter of those that must otherwise be killed in the progress of the war, both on their own side and on that of their enemies, by the death of a few that are most guilty; and that in so doing they are kind even to their enemies, and pity them no less than their own people, as knowing that the greater part of them do not engage in the, war of their own accord, but are driven into it by the passions of their prince. 8. If this method does not succeed with them, then they sow seeds of contention among their enemies, and animate the prince's brother, or some of the nobility, to aspire to the crown. If they cannot disunite them by domestic broils, then they engage their neighbors against them, and make them set on foot some old pretensions, which are never wanting to princes when they have occasion for them. These they plentifully supply with money, though but very sparingly with any auxiliary troops: for they are so tender of their own people, that they would not willingly exchange one of them, even with the prince of their enemies' country. 9. But as they keep their gold and silver only for such an occasion, so when that offers itself they easily part with it, since it would be no inconvenience to them though they should reserve nothing of it to themselves. For besides the wealth that they have among them at home, they have a vast treasure abroad, many nations round about them being deep in their debt: so that they hire soldiers from all places for carrying on their wars, but chiefly from the Zapolets, who live 500 miles east of Utopia. 10. They are a rude, wild, and fierce nation, who delight in the woods and rocks, among which they were born and bred up. They are hardened both against heat, cold, and labor, and know nothing of the delicacies of life. They do not apply themselves to agriculture, nor do they care either for their houses or their clothes. Cattle is all that they look after; and for the greatest part they live either by hunting, or upon rapine; and are made, as it were, only for war. They watch all opportunities of engaging in it, and very readily embrace such as are offered them. Great numbers of them will frequently go out, and offer themselves for a very low pay, to serve any that will employ them: they know none of the arts of life, but those that lead to the taking it away; they serve those that hire them, both with much courage and great fidelity. 11. But they will not engage to serve for any determined time, and agree upon such terms, that the next day they may go over to the enemies of those whom they serve, if they offer them a greater encouragement: and will perhaps return to them the day after that, upon a higher advance of their pay. There are few wars in which they make not a considerable part of the armies of both sides: so it often falls out that they who are related, and were hired in the same country, and so have lived long and familiarly together, forgetting both their relations and former friendship, kill one another upon no other consideration than that of being hired to it for a little money, by princes of different interests; and such a regard have they for money, that they are easily wrought on by the difference of one penny a day to change sides. So entirely does their avarice influence them; and yet this money, which they value so highly, is of little use to them; for what they purchase thus with their blood, they quickly waste on luxury, which among them is but of a poor and miserable form. 12. This nation serves the Utopians against all people whatsoever, for they pay higher than any other. The Utopians hold this for a maxim, that as they seek out the best sort of men for their own use at home, so they make use of this worst sort of men for the consumption of war, and therefore they hire them with the offers of vast rewards, to expose themselves to all sorts of hazards, out of which the greater part never returns to claim their promises. Yet they make them good most religiously to such as escape. This animates them to adventure again, whenever there is occasion for it; for the Utopians are not at all troubled how many of these happen to be killed, and reckon it a service done to mankind if they could be a means to deliver the world from such a lewd and vicious sort of people; that seem to have run together as to the drain of human nature. 13. Next to these they are served in their wars with those upon whose account they undertake them, and with the auxiliary troops of their other friends, to whom they join a few of their own people, and send some men of eminent and approved virtue to command in chief. There are two sent with him, who during his command are but private men, but the first is to succeed him if he should happen to be either killed or taken; and in case of the like misfortune to him, the third comes in his place; and thus they provide against ill events, that such accidents as may befall their generals may not endanger their armies. 14. When they draw out troops of their own people, they take such out of every city as freely offer themselves, for none are forced to go against their wills, since they think that if any man is pressed that wants courage, he will not only act faintly, but by his cowardice dishearten others. But if an invasion is made on their country they make use of such men, if they have good bodies, though they are not brave; and either put them aboard their ships or place them on the walls of their towns, that being so posted they may find no opportunity of flying away; and thus either shame, the heat of action, or the impossibility of flying, bears down their cowardice; they often make a virtue of necessity and behave themselves well, because nothing else is left them. 15. But as they force no man to go into any foreign war against his will, so they do not hinder those women who are willing to go along with their husbands; on the contrary, they encourage and praise them, and they stand often next their husbands in the front of the army. They also place together those who are related, parents and children, kindred, and those that are mutually allied, near one another; that those whom nature has inspired with the greatest zeal for assisting one another, may be the nearest and readiest to do it; and it is matter of great reproach if husband or wife survive one another, or if a child survives his parents, and therefore when they come to be engaged in action they continue to fight to the last man, if their enemies stand before them. 16. And as they use all prudent methods to avoid the endangering their own men, and if it is possible let all the action and danger fall upon the troops that they hire, so if it becomes necessary for themselves to engage, they then charge with as much courage as they avoided it before with prudence: nor is it a fierce charge at first, but it increases by degrees; and as they continue in action, they grow more obstinate and press harder upon the enemy, insomuch that they will much sooner die than give ground; for the certainty that their children will be well looked after when they are dead, frees them from all that anxiety concerning them which often masters men of great courage; and thus they are animated by a noble and invincible resolution. Their skill in military affairs increases their courage; and the wise sentiments which, according to the laws of their country, are instilled into them in their education, give additional vigor to their minds: for as they do not undervalue life so as prodigally to throw it away, they are not so indecently fond of it as to preserve it by base and unbecoming methods. 17. In the greatest heat of action, the bravest of their youth, who have devoted themselves to that service, single out the general of their enemies, set on him either openly or by ambuscade, pursue him everywhere, and when spent and wearied out, are relieved by others, who never give over the pursuit; either attacking him with close weapons when they can get near him, or with those which wound at a distance, when others get in between them; so that unless he secures himself by flight, they seldom fail at last to kill or to take him prisoner. When they have obtained a victory, they kill as few as possible, and are much more bent on taking many prisoners than on killing those that fly before them; nor do they ever let their men so loose in the pursuit of their enemies, as not to retain an entire body still in order; so that if they have been forced to engage the last of their battalions before they could gain the day, they will rather let their enemies all escape than pursue them, when their own army is in disorder; remembering well what has often fallen out to themselves, that when the main body of their army has been quite defeated and broken, when their enemies imagining the victory obtained, have let themselves loose into an irregular pursuit, a few of them that lay for a reserve, waiting a fit opportunity, have fallen on them in their chase, and when straggling in disorder and apprehensive of no danger, but counting the day their own, have turned the whole action, and wrestling out of their hands a victory that seemed certain and undoubted, while the vanquished have suddenly become victorious. 18. It is hard to tell whether they are more dexterous in laying or avoiding ambushes. They sometimes seem to fly when it is far from their thoughts; and when they intend to give ground, they do it so that it is very hard to find out their design. If they see they are ill posted, or are like to be overpowered by numbers, they then either march off in the night with great silence, or by some stratagem delude their enemies: if they retire in the daytime, they do it in such order, that it is no less dangerous to fall upon them in a retreat than in a march. They fortify their camps with a deep and large trench, and throw up the earth that is dug out of it for a wall; nor do they employ only their slaves in this, but the whole army works at it, except those that are then upon the guard; so that when so many hands are at work, a great line and a strong fortification are finished in so short a time that it is scarce credible. 19. Their armor is very strong for defence, and yet is not so heavy as to make them uneasy in their marches; they can even swim with it. All that are trained up to war practice swimming. Both horse and foot make great use of arrows, and are very expert. They have no swords, but fight with a pole-axe that is both sharp and heavy, by which they thrust or strike down an enemy. They are very good at finding out warlike machines, and disguise them so well, that the enemy does not perceive them till he feels the use of them; so that he cannot prepare such a defence as would render them useless; the chief consideration had in the making them is that they may be easily carried and managed. 20. If they agree to a truce, they observe it so religiously that no provocations will make them break it. They never lay their enemies' country waste nor burn their corn, and even in their marches they take all possible care that neither horse nor foot may tread it down, for they do not know but that they may have use for it-themselves. They hurt no man whom they find disarmed, unless he is a spy. When a town is surrendered to them, they take it into their protection; and when they carry a place by storm, they never plunder it, but put those only to the sword that opposed the rendering of it up, and make the rest of the garrison slaves, but for the other inhabitants, they do them no hurt; and if any of them had advised a surrender, they give them good rewards out of the estates of those that they condemn, and distribute the rest among their auxiliary troops, but they themselves take no share of the spoil. 21. When a war is ended, they do not oblige their friends to reimburse their expenses; but they obtain them of the conquered, either in money, which they keep for the next occasion, or in lands, out of which a constant revenue is to be paid them; by many increases, the revenue which they draw out from several countries on such occasions, is now risen to above 700,000 ducats a year. They send some of their own people to receive these revenues, who have orders to live magnificently, and like princes, by which means they consume much of it upon the place; and either bring over the rest to Utopia, or lend it to that nation in which it lies. This they most commonly do, unless some great occasion, which falls out but very seldom, should oblige them to call for it all. It is out of these lands that they assign rewards to such as they encourage to adventure on desperate attempts. 22. If any prince that engages in war with them is making preparations for invading their country, they prevent him, and make his country the seat of the war; for they do not willingly suffer any war to break in upon their island; and if that should happen, they would only defend themselves by their own people, but would not call for auxiliary troops to their assistance. **********************TIME TRIETH TRUTH********************* Luc Borot home 33-67 52 07 98 fax 33-67 14 24 65 work 33-67 14 24 49/33-67 14 24 48 Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Renaissance Anglaise Universite Paul Valery --- Montpellier (France) Date: Tue, 21 Nov 1995 03:03:20 -0800 (PST) Subject: 5:3: Latin text on war From: Luc Borot Sender: owner-emls-utopia Precedence: bulk **A note on this text: it is the OTA text. I have introduced paragraphs according to the new Cambridge edition by Logan, Adams and Miller, with Latin text and English translation (CUP, 1995). I have not altered the punctuation to match the new edition, except where it could help keeping meaning, syntax and alineation together. I have also introduced paragraphs in the wiretap/OTA English text to match the divisions of the Latin. The corresponding English text is sent as message 5:4 on emls-utopia.** De re militari. 1. Bellum utpote rem plane beluinam, nec ulli tamen beluarum formae in tam assiduo, atque homini est usu, summopere abominantur, contraque morem gentium ferme omnium nihil aeque ducunt inglorium, atque petitam e bello gloriam. eoque licet assidue militari sese disciplina exerceant, neque id uiri modo, sed foeminae quoque, statis diebus, ne ad bellum sint, quum exigat usus, inhabiles; non temere capessunt tamen, nisi quo aut suos fines tueantur, aut amicorum terris, infusos hostes propulsent, aut populum quempiam tyrannide pressum, miserati, (quod humanitatis gratia faciunt) suis uiribus Tyranni iugo, & seruitute liberent. Quanquam auxilium gratificantur amicis non semper quidem, quo se defendant, sed interdum quoque illatas retalient, atque ulciscantur iniurias. uerum id ita demum faciunt, si re adhuc integra consulantur ipsi, & probata causa, repetitis ac non redditis rebus belli autores inferendi sint, quod non tunc solum decernunt, quoties hostili incursu abacta est praeda, uerum tum quoque multo infestius, quum eorum negotiatores usquam gentium, uel iniquarum praetextu legum, uel sinistra deriuatione bonarum, iniustam subeunt, iustitiae colore, calumniam. 2. Nec alia fuit eius origo belli, quod pro Nephelogetis aduersus Alaopolitas, paulo ante nostram memoriam, Utopienses gessere, quam apud Alaopolitas Nephelogetarum mercatoribus illata praetextu iuris (ut uisum est ipsis) iniuria certe, siue illud ius, siue ea iniuria fuit, bello tam atroci est uindicata, quum ad proprias utriusque partis uires, odiaque circumiectarum etiam gentium studia atque opes adiungerentur, ut florentissimis populorum alijs concussis, alijs uehementer afflictis, orientia ex malis mala, Alaopolitarum seruitus demum, ac deditio finierit, qua in Nephelogetarum (neque enim sibi certabant Utopienses) potestatem concessere, gentis, florentibus Alaopolitarum rebus, haud quaquam cum illis conferendae. 3. Tam acriter Utopienses amicorum, etiam in pecunijs, iniuriam persequuntur, suas ipsorum, non item, qui sicubi circunscripti bonis excidant, modo corporibus absit uis hactenus irascuntur, uti quoad satisfactio fiat, eius commercio gentis abstineant. Non quod minoris sibi curae ciues, quam socij sint, sed horum tamen pecuniam intercipi, aegrius quam suam ferunt, propterea quod amicorum negotiatores, quoniam de suo perdunt priuato, graue uulnus ex iactura sentiunt. At ipsorum ciuibus nihil nisi de publica perit. praeterea quod abundabat domi, ac ueluti supererat, alioqui non emittendum foras. Quo fit uti intertrimentum citra cuiusquam sensum accidat. Quo circa nimis crudele censent id damnum multorum ulcisci mortibus, cuius damni incommodum nemo ipsorum, aut uita, aut uictu persentiscat. Caeterum si quis suorum usquam per iniuriam debilitetur, aut occidat, siue id publico factum consilio, siue priuato sit, per legatos re comperta, nisi deditis noxijs placari non possunt, quin ilico bellum denuncient. Noxae deditos, aut morte, aut seruitio puniunt. 4. Cruentae uictoriae non piget modo eos, sed pudet quoque, reputantes inscitiam esse quamlibet preciosas merces nimio emisse, arte doloque uictos, oppressos hostes impendio gloriantur, triumphumque ob eam rem publicitus agunt, & uelut re strennue gesta, tropheum erigunt. tunc enim demum uiriliter sese iactant, & cum uirtute gessisse, quoties ita uicerint, quomodo nullum animal praeter hominem potuit, id est ingenij uiribus. Nam corporis inquiunt ursi, leones, apri, lupi, canes, caeteraeque beluae dimicant, quarum ut pleraeque nos robore ac ferocia uincunt, ita cunctae ingenio, & ratione superantur. 5. Hoc unum illi in bello spectant, uti id obtineant, quod si fuissent ante consequuti, bellum non fuerant illaturi. aut si id res uetet, tam seueram ab his uindictam expetunt, quibus factum imputant, ut idem ausuros in posterum terror absterreat. Hos propositi sui scopos destinant, quos mature petunt, at ita tamen, uti prior uitandi periculi cura, quam laudis aut famae consequendae sit. 6. Itaque protinus indicto bello, schedulas ipsorum publico signo roboratas, locis maxime conspicuis hosticae terrae, clam uno tempore multas appendi procurant, quibus ingentia pollicentur praemia, si quis principem aduersarium sustulerit, deinde minora quanquam illa quoque egregia decernunt, pro singulis eorum capitibus, quorum nomina in ijsdem literis proscribunt, hij sunt quos secundum principem ipsum, autores initi aduersus se consilij ducunt. Quicquid percussori praefiniunt, hoc geminant ei, qui uiuum e proscriptis aliquem ad se perduxerit, quum ipsos quoque proscriptos, praemijs ijsdem, addita etiam impunitate, contra socios inuitant. Itaque fit celeriter, ut & caeteros mortales suspectos habeant, & sibi inuicem ipsi, neque fidentes satis, neque fidi sint, maximoque in metu & non minore periculo uersentur. Nam saepenumero constat euenisse, uti bona pars eorum & princeps in primis ipse ab his proderentur, in quibus maximam spem reposuerunt. Tam facile quoduis in facinus impellunt munera, quibus illi nullum exhibent modum. Sed memores in quantum discrimen hortantur, operam dant, uti periculi magnitudo beneficiorum mole compensetur. eoque non immensam modo auri uim, sed praedia quoque magni reditus in locis apud amicos tutissimis, propria ac perpetua pollicitantur, & summa cum fide praestant. 7. Hunc licitandi mercandique hostis morem, apud alios improbatum, uelut animi degeneris crudele facinus illi magnae sibi laudi ducunt, tanquam prudentes, qui maximis hoc pacto bellis, sine ullo prorsus praelio defungantur, humanique ac misericordes etiam, qui paucorum nece noxiorum, numerosas innocentium uitas redimant, qui pugnando fuerint occubituri. Partim e suis, partim ex hostibus, quorum turbam, uulgusque non minus ferme quam suos miserantur, gnari non sua sponte eos bellum capessere, sed principum ad id furijs agi. 8. Si res hoc pacto non procedat, dissidiorum semina iaciunt, aluntque fratre principis, aut aliquo e nobilibus in spem potiundi regni perducto. Si factiones internae languerint, finitimas hostibus gentes excitant, committuntque, eruto uetusto quopiam titulo, quales nunquam regibus desunt, suas ad bellum opes polliciti, pecuniam affluenter suggerunt. 9. Ciues parcissime, quos tam unice habent charos, tantique sese mutuo faciunt, ut neminem sint e suis cum aduerso principe libenter commutaturi. At aurum, argentumque quoniam unum hunc in usum omne seruant, haud grauatim erogant, utpote non minus commode uicturi, etiam si uniuersum impenderent. Quin praeter domesticas diuitias est illis foris quoque infinitus thesaurus, quo plurimae gentes, uti ante dixi, in ipsorum aere sunt. ita milites undique conductos ad bellum mittunt, praesertim ex Zapoletis. 10. Hic populus quingentis passuum millibus ab Utopia distat, orientem solem uersus, horridus, agrestis, ferox, syluas montesque asperos, quibus sunt innutriti, praeferunt. Dura gens, aestus, frigoris, & laboris patiens, delitiarum expers omnium, neque agriculturae studens, & cum aedificiorum tum uestitus indiligens, pecorum duntaxat curam habent. Magna ex parte uenatu & raptu uiuunt. Ad solum bellum nati, cuius gerendi facultatem studiose quaerunt, repertam cupide amplectuntur, & magno numero egressi, cuiuis requirenti milites uili semet offerunt. Hanc unam uitae artem nouerunt, qua mors quaeritur, sub quibus merent, acriter pro hijs & incorrupta fide dimicant. 11. Uerum in nullum certum diem sese obstringunt, sed ea lege in partes ueniunt, ut postero die, uel ab hostibus, oblato maiore stipendio sint staturi, ijsdem perendie rursus inuitati plusculo remigrant. Rarum oritur bellum, in quo non bona pars illorum in utroque sint exercitu. itaque accidit quotidie, ut sanguinis necessitudine coniuncti, qui & ijsdem in partibus conducti familiarissime semet inuicem utebantur, paulo post in contrarias distracti copias, hostiliter concurrant. & infestis animis, obliti generis, immemores amicitiae, mutuo sese confodiant, nulla alia causa in mutuam incitati perniciem, quam quod a diuersis principibus exigua pecuniola conducti, cuius tam exactam habent rationem, ut ad diurnum stipendium unius accessione assis facile ad commutandas partes impellantur. Ita celeriter imbiberunt auaritiam, quae tamen nulli est eis usui. Nam quae sanguine quaerunt, protinus per luxum, & eum tamen miserum consumunt. 12. Hic populus Utopiensibus aduersus quosuis mortales militat, quod tanti ab hijs eorum conducatur opera quanti nusquam alibi. Utopienses siquidem ut bonos quaerunt quibus utantur ita hos quoque homines pessimos quibus abutantur. quos quum usus postulat, magnis impulsos pollicitationibus, maximis obijciunt periculis, unde plerunque magna pars nunquam ad exigenda promissa reuertitur, superstitibus, quae sunt polliciti bona fide, persoluunt, quo ad similes ausus incendantur. Neque enim pensi quicquam habent, quam multos ex eis perdant. Rati de genere humano maximam merituros gratiam se, si tota illa colluuie populi tam tetri, ac nepharij orbem terrarum purgare possent. 13. Secundum hos eorum copijs utuntur, pro quibus arma capiunt, deinde auxiliaribus caeterorum amicorum turmis. Postremo suos ciues adiungunt, e quibus aliquem uirtutis probatae uirum, totius exercitus summae praeficiunt. Huic duos ita substituunt, uti eo incolumi, ambo priuati sint, capto aut interempto, alter e duobus uelut haereditate succedat, eique ex euentu tertius, ne (ut sunt bellorum sortes uariae) periclitante duce totus perturbetur exercitus. 14. E quaque ciuitate delectus exercetur ex his, qui sponte nomen profitentur. neque enim inuitus quisquam foras in militiam truditur, quod persuasum habeant, si quis sit natura timidior, non ipsum modo nihil facturum strennue, sed metum etiam comitibus incussurum. Caeterum si quod bellum ingruat in patriam, ignauos huiusmodi, modo ualeant corpore, in naues mixtos melioribus collocant; Aut in moenibus sparsim disponunt. unde non sit refugiendi locus. ita suorum pudor, hostis in manibus, atque adempta fugae spes, timorem obruunt, & saepe extrema necessitas in uirtutem uertitur. 15. At sicuti ad externum bellum ex ipsis nemo protrahitur nolens, ita foeminas uolentes in militiam comitari maritos, adeo non prohibent, ut exhortentur etiam, & laudibus incitent, profectas cum suo quamque uiro, pariter in acie constituunt. tum sui quemque liberi affines cognati circunsistunt, ut hi de proximo sint mutuo sibi subsidio, quos maxime ad ferendas inuicem suppetias natura stimulat. In maximo probro est coniunx absque coniuge redux, aut amisso parente reuersus filius, quo fit, uti si ad ipsorum manus uentum sit modo perstent hostes, longo & lugubri praelio ad internitionem usque decernatur. 16. Nempe ut omnibus curant modis ne ipsis dimicare necesse sit, modo bello possint uicaria conductitiorum manu defungi, ita quum uitari non potest quin ipsi ineant pugnam, tam intrepide capessunt, quam quoad licuit prudenter detrectabant, nec tam primo ferociunt impetu quam mora sensim & duratione inualescunt, tam offirmatis animis ut interimi citius quam auerti queant; quippe uictus illa securitas quae cuique domi est, ademptaque de posteris anxia cogitandi cura (nam haec solicitudo generosos ubique spiritus frangit) sublimem illis animum & uinci dedignantem facit. Ad haec militaris disciplinae peritia fiduciam praebet, postremo rectae opiniones (quibus & doctrina & bonis reipublicae institutis imbuti a pueris sunt) uirtutem addunt. qua neque tam uilem habent uitam, ut temere prodigant, neque tam improbe charam, ut quum honestas ponendam suadeat, auare turpiterque retineant. 17. Dum ubique pugna maxima feruet, lectissimi iuuenes coniurati, deuotique, ducem sibi deposcunt aduersum, hunc aperte inuadunt, hunc ex insidijs adoriuntur, idem eminus idem cominus petitur, longoque ac perpetuo cuneo, summissis assidue in fatigatorum locum recentibus, oppugnatur. raroque accidit (ni sibi fuga prospiciat) ut non intereat aut uiuus in hostium potestatem ueniat. Si ab ipsis uictoria sit, haudquaquam caede grassantur, fugatos enim comprehendunt, quam occidunt libentius. neque unquam ita persequuntur fugientes, ut non unam interim sub signis instructam aciem retineant, adeo nisi caeteris superati partibus, postrema acie sua uictoriam adepti sint, elabi potius hostes uniuersos sinant, quam insequi fugientes perturbatis suorum ordinibus insuescant. memores sibimet haud semel usu uenisse, ut mole totius exercitus uicta profligataque, quum hostes uictoria gestientes, hac atque illac abeuntes persequerentur, pauci ipsorum in subsidijs collocati ad occasiones intenti, dispersos ac palantes illos & praesumpta securitate negligentes derepente adorti, totius euentum praelij mutauerunt. extortaque e manibus tam certa & indubitata uictoria, uicti uictores inuicem uicerunt. 18. Haud facile dictu est, astutiores instruendis insidijs, an cautiores ad uitandas sient. fugam parare credas, quum nihil minus in animo habent, contra quum id consilij capiunt, nihil minus cogitare putes. Nam si nimium sese sentiunt, aut numero, aut loco premi, tunc aut noctu, agmine silente, castra mouent, aut aliquo stratagemate eludunt, aut interdiu ita sensim sese referunt, tali seruato ordine, ut non minus periculi sit cedentes quam instantes adoriri. Castra diligentissime communiunt fossa prealta lataque, terra quae egeritur introrsum reiecta, nec in eam rem opera mediastinorum utuntur, ipsorum manibus militum res agitur, totusque exercitus in opere est, exceptis qui pro uallo in armis ad subitos casus excubant. Itaque tam multis adnitentibus, magna multumque amplexa loci munimenta, omni fide citius perficiunt. 19. Armis utuntur ad excipiendos ictus, firmis, nec ad motum gestumue quemlibet ineptis, adeo ut ne natando quidem molesta sentiant. Nam armati natare inter militaris disciplinae rudimenta consuescunt. tela sunt eminus sagittae, quas acerrime simul & certissime iaculantur non pedites modo, sed ex equis etiam, cominus uero non gladij, sed secures uel acie letales uel pondere seu caesim seu punctim feriant. Machinas excogitant solertissime, factas accuratissime caelant ne ante proditae quam res postulet, ludibrio magis quam usui sint, in quibus fabricandis hoc in primis respiciunt, uti uectu faciles & habiles circumactu sint. 20. Initas cum hostibus inducias tam sancte obseruant, ut ne lacessiti quidem uiolent. Hostilem terram non depopulantur, neque segetes exurunt, imo ne hominum equorumue pedibus, conterantur, quantum fieri potest prouident, rati in ipsorum usus crescere. Inermem neminem laedunt, nisi idem speculator sit. Deditas urbes tuentur, at nec expugnatas, diripiunt, sed per quos deditio est impedita eos enecant, caeteris defensoribus in seruitutem addictis. Imbellem turbam omnem relinquunt intactam. Si quos deditionem suasisse compererint, his e damnatorum bonis aliquam partem impartiunt, reliqua sectione auxiliares donant. Nam ipsorum nemo quicquam de praeda capit. 21. Caeterum confecto bello, non amicis impensas in quos insumpsere, sed uictis imputant, exiguntque eo nomine, partim pecuniam quam in similes bellorum usus reseruant, partim praedia quae sint ipsis apud eos perpetua non exigui census. Huiusmodi reditus nunc apud multas gentes habent, qui uarijs ex causis paulatim nati, supra septingenta ducatorum millia in singulos annos excreuere, in quos e suis ciuibus aliquos emittunt quaestorum nomine, qui magnifice uiuant, personamque magnatum illic prae se ferant, at multum tamen superest quod inferatur aerario, nisi malint eidem genti credere, quod saepe tantisper faciunt, quoad uti necesse sit uixque accidit unquam, ut totam reposcant. Ex his praedijs partem assignant illis, qui ipsorum hortatu tale discrimen adeunt quale ante monstraui. 22. Si quis princeps armis aduersus eos sumptis, eorum ditionem paret inuadere, magnis illico uiribus extra suos fines occurrunt; nam neque temere in suis terris bellum gerunt, neque ulla necessitas tanta est, ut eos cogat aliena auxilia in insulam suam admittere. **********************TIME TRIETH TRUTH********************* Luc Borot home 33-67 52 07 98 fax 33-67 14 24 65 work 33-67 14 24 49/33-67 14 24 48 Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Renaissance Anglaise Universite Paul Valery --- Montpellier (France) Date: Thu, 30 Nov 1995 06:56:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: 6:1: optarim verius, quam sperarim From: mrh@arts.gla.ac.uk (Mary Haight) Sender: owner-emls-utopia Precedence: bulk Status: O X-Status: As an overworked academic I have so little time to try truth that my contributions will probably always be late. But here are a few thoughts. With so complex a person as (I think) More manifestly was, the question of sincerity becomes difficult. I think there were several Mores (though they overlap) created by the tyrants whom he chose to rule his life and couldn't always reconcile: his God and his king (as he said himself) but also his God's church and his own great personal ambition. I think that Utopia represents a side that was perhaps the closest he came to freedom: in which he could both play and consider things that mattered essentially to him (politics and morality) out of reach of his tyrants. In particular I think it represents a holiday from Christendom, in which he can consider (e.g.) divorce, without having to assume certain (Christian) attitudes a priori. I think that it represents a personality that was genuine, largely discontinuous with his public ones, but continuous with his classical studies and his friendship with Erasmus: look for example at the books Hythloday chooses to take to Utopia. Not a Christian text among them, but including not just Lucian but Aristophanes: play, but also social comment. Think how Europeans going to the New World (especially the Spanish in South America) really behaved, on Christian principles which More must in fact have shared - the Christian More, that is. Utopia also allows him to act out conflicts between the different parts of himself: I liked Robert Schultz's comment on this. So I think Utopia is also a holiday from the usual constraint on us to think and behave consistently: a complex person needs this, or he may not be able to function. Ambiguity and/or ambivalence seem to run right through from the beginning. Why call it 'Utopia' when he could have spelled out either 'Outopia' or 'Eutopia'? Instead he writes a little verse underlining the two possible interpretations (by the way, my own English translation here would be 'Noplace' and 'Showplace'.) Why give his 'Nonsensetalker' Hythlodaeus the first name of Raphael, an archangel? Angels are messengers of God, so presumably of truth. And that last sentence is a beauty. 'Sperarim' just _is_ ambiguous between 'hope'and 'expect' and I suspect was chosen for this reason. 'Optarim' I think could mean just 'choose' in some contexts as opposed to 'wish' (what do you think?) and anyway it has both senses. Also it's 'I _would_ hope/expect' not 'I hope' (Adams is right here) - a further distancing from whatever's being said. Is the underlying sense perhaps 'In a different world, where I was free of my king and my God to use reason undictated to (as the Greeks could), I might choose =8A but then on the othe= r hand I'm not in that world and cannot consistently even hope, much less expect =8A '? And of course 'permulta' doesn't specify _which_ features of Utopia are in question. Was the nonsense or the fictional form of Utopia meant as a disguise of his views, in a world where saying the wrong thing could get you disembowled? In fact I doubt it (I agree with Dan Lochman here) - except perhaps as a defense against very stupid enemies, or not very powerful ones. A plea of nonsense or fiction wouldn't have saved him if, for example, the king had spotted anything that looked like a personal attack. (Compare Salman Rushdie's first plea against the Ayatollah's fatwa: 'But this is to misunderstand what fiction is!'. A desperate and not very credible move: the Satanic Verses contain a very unflattering satire in the Ayatollah and to understand fiction is to understand how this is possible.) More would have known this, surely, and realised that Utopia was not really so dangerous. There may be an element of gambling with danger in it, though (I think there are elements of most of the possible interpretations!). On the other hand, the ambiguities are more of a disguise, I suspect -maybe even from other sides of More. Dan Lochman speaks of Utopia's 'refusal to lift the veil sufficiently to allow us to comprehend Morus' - and the implied intended - reading': not wanting to commit himself to -himself- (or selves?) could be one reason for the refusal. Was More (are most Utopians) a pessimist about human beings? Well, you don't have to be one or the other if you think that people are of different kinds: look at Plato's gold, silver and bronze classes in the Republic. Plato is optimistic about philosophers and pessimistic about grocers. I think that to see education as producing understanding, and understanding as leading to right action (which doesn't always follow, whatever Socrates thought) is to be optimistic (or hopeful, shall we say); to see it as a mere training in desirable habits, incuding doing what the masters say (as you could also train a horse) is pessimistic. More has wise reasoners in Utopia and priests who are very holy (and therefore very few) - and others whom they teach. But how far teaching is supposed to produce real understanding rather than horse sense, I don't know. Mary Haight ************************TIME TRIETH TRUTH************************ *e-mail: lb@alor.univ-montp3.fr - lb@bred.univ-montp3.fr *Prof. Luc Borot - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches *sur la Renaissance Anglaise *Universite Paul-Valery, Montpellier (France) *phone: 33-67142448 - 33-67142449 - fax 33-67142465