Sect. IX. Of the
Reason of Animals
82. ALL our reasonings concerning
matter of fact are founded on a
species of Analogy, which leads
us to expect from any cause the same
events, which we have observed to
result from similar causes. Where
the causes are entirely similar,
the analogy is perfect, and the
inference, drawn from it, is regarded
as certain and conclusive: nor
does any man ever entertain a doubt
where he sees a piece of iron,
that it will have weight and cohesion
of parts; as in all other
instances, which have ever fallen
under his observation. But where the
objects have not so exact a similarity,
the analogy is less perfect,
and the inference is less conclusive;
though still it has some
force, in proportion to the degree
of similarity and resemblance.
The anatomical observations, formed
upon one animal, are, by this
species of reasoning, extended to
all animals; and it is certain, that
when the circulation of the blood,
for instance, is clearly proved
to have place in one creature, as
a frog, or fish, it forms a strong
presumption, that the same principle
has place in all. These
analogical observations may be carried
farther, even to this
science, of which we are now treating;
and any theory, by which we
explain the operations of the understanding,
or the origin and
connexion of the passions in man,
will acquire additional authority,
if we find, that the same theory
is requisite to explain the same
phenomena in all other animals.
We shall make trial of this, with
regard to the hypothesis, by which
we have, in the foregoing
discourse, endeavoured to account
for all experimental reasonings; and
it is hoped, that this new point
of view will serve to confirm all our
former observations.
83. First, It seems evident,
that animals as well as men learn
many things from experience, and
infer, that the same events will
always follow from the same causes.
By this principle they become
acquainted with the more obvious
properties of external objects, and
gradually, from their birth, treasure
up a knowledge of the nature
of fire, water, earth, stones, heights,
depths, &c., and of the
effects which result from their
operation. The ignorance and
inexperience of the young are here
plainly distinguishable from the
cunning and sagacity of the old,
who have learned, by long
observation, to avoid what hurt
them, and to pursue what gave ease
or pleasure. A horse, that has been
accustomed to the field, becomes
acquainted with the proper height
which he can leap, and will never
attempt what exceeds his force and
ability. An old greyhound will
trust the more fatiguing part of
the chace to the younger, and will
place himself so as to meet the
hare in her doubles; nor are the
conjectures, which he forms on this
occasion, founded in any thing but
his observation and experience.
This is still more evident
from the effects of discipline and
education on animals, who, by the
proper application of rewards and
punishments, may be taught any course
of action, and most contrary
to their natural instincts and propensities.
Is it not experience
which renders a dog apprehensive
of pain, when you menace him, or lift
up the whip to beat him? Is is not
even experience, which makes him
answer to his name, and infer, from
such an arbitrary sound, that
you mean him rather than any of
his fellows, and intend to call him,
when you pronounce it in a certain
manner, and with a certain tone and
accent?
In all these cases, we may
observe, that the animal infers some fact
beyond what immediately strikes
his senses; and that this inference is
altogether founded on past experience,
while the creature expects from
the present object the same consequences,
which it has always found in
its observation to result from similar
objects.
84. Secondly, It is impossible,
that this inference of the animal
can be founded on any process of
argument or reasoning, by which he
concludes, that like events must
follow like objects, and that the
course of nature will always be
regular in its operations. For if
there be in reality any arguments
of this nature, they surely lie
too abstruse for the observation
of such imperfect understandings;
since it may well employ the utmost
care and attention of a
philosophic genius to discover and
observe them. Animals, therefore,
are not guided in these inferences
by reasoning: Neither are children:
Neither are the generality of mankind,
in their ordinary actions and
conclusions: Neither are philosophers
themselves, who, in all the
active parts of life, are, in the
main, the same with the vulgar,
and are governed by the same maxims.
Nature must have provided some
other principle, of more ready,
and more general use and
application; nor can an operation
of such immense consequence in life,
as that of inferring effects from
causes, be trusted to the
uncertain process of reasoning and
argumentation. Were this doubtful
with regard to men, it seems to
admit of no question with regard to
the brute creation; and the conclusion
being once firmly established
in the one, we have a strong presumption,
from all the rules of
analogy, that it ought to be universally
admitted, without any
exception or reserve. It is custom
alone, which engages animals,
from every object, that strikes
their senses, to infer its usual
attendant, and carries their imagination,
from the appearance of the
one, to conceive the other, in that
particular manner, which we
denominate belief. No other explication
can be given of this
operation, in all the higher, as
well as lower classes of sensitive
beings, which fall under our notice
and observation.*
* Since all reasonings concerning
facts or causes is derived
merely from custom, it may be asked
how it happens, that men so much
surpass animals in reasoning, and
one man so much surpasses another?
Has not the same custom the same
influence on all?
We shall here endeavour briefly
to explain the great difference in
human understandings: After which
the reason of the difference between
men and animals will easily be comprehended.
1. When we have lived any
time, and have been accustomed to the
uniformity of nature, we acquire
a general habit, by which we always
transfer the known to the unknown,
and conceive the latter to resemble
the former. By means of this general
habitual principle, we regard
even one experiment as the foundation
of reasoning, and expect a
similar event with some degree of
certainty, where the experiment
has been made accurately, and free
from all foreign circumstances.
It is therefore considered as a
matter of great importance to
observe the consequences of things;
and as one man may very much
surpass another in attention and
memory and observation, this will
make a very great difference in
their reasoning.
2. Where there is a complication
of causes to produce any effect,
one mind may be much larger than
another, and better able to
comprehend the whole system of objects,
and to infer justly their
consequences.
3. One man is able to carry
on a chain of consequences to a
greater length than another.
4. Few men can think long
without running into a confusion of ideas,
and mistaking one for another; and
there are various degrees of this
infirmity.
5. The circumstance, on which
the effect depends, is frequently
involved in other circumstances,
which are foreign and extrinsic.
The separation of it often requires
great attention, accuracy, and
subtilty.
6. The forming of general
maxims from particular observation is a
very nice operation; and nothing
is more usual, from haste or a
narrowness of mind, which sees not
on all sides, than to commit
mistakes in this particular.
7. When we reason from analogies,
the man, who has the greater
experience or the greater promptitude
of suggesting analogies, will be
the better reasoner.
8. Byasses from prejudice,
education, passion, party, &c. hang
more upon one mind than another.
9. After we have acquired
a confidence in human testimony, books and
conversation enlarge much more the
sphere of one man's experience
and thought than those of another.
It would be easy to discover
many other circumstances that make a
difference in the understandings
of men.
85. But though animals learn
many parts of their knowledge from
observation, there are also many
parts of it, which they derive from
the original hand of nature; which
much exceed the share of capacity
they possess on ordinary occasions;
and in which they improve,
little or nothing, by the longest
practice and experience. These we
denominate Instincts, and are so
apt to admire as something very
extraordinary, and inexplicable
by all the disquisitions of human
understanding. But our wonder will,
perhaps, cease or diminish, when
we consider, that the experimental
reasoning itself, which we
possess in common with beasts, and
on which the whole conduct of
life depends, is nothing but a species
of instinct or mechanical
power, that acts in us unknown to
ourselves; and in its chief
operations, is not directed by any
such relations or comparisons of
ideas, as are the proper objects
of our intellectual faculties. Though
the instinct be different, yet still
it is an instinct, which
teaches a man to avoid the fire;
as much as that, which teaches a
bird, with such exactness, the art
of incubation, and the whole
economy and order of its nursery.
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