Sect. III. Of
the Association of Ideas
18. IT is evident that there
is a principle of connexion between the
different thoughts or ideas of the
mind, and that, in their appearance
to the memory or imagination, they
introduce each other with a certain
degree of method and regularity.
In our more serious thinking or
discourse this is so observable
that any particular thought, which
breaks in upon the regular tract
or chain of ideas, is immediately
remarked and rejected. And even
in our wildest and most wandering
reveries, nay in our very dreams,
we shall find, if we reflect, that
the imagination ran not altogether
at adventures, but that there was
still a connexion upheld among the
different ideas, which succeeded
each other. Were the loosest and
freest conversation to be
transcribed, there would immediately
be observed something which
connected it in all its transitions.
Or where this is wanting, the
person who broke the thread of discourse
might still inform you,
that there had secretly revolved
in his mind a succession of
thought, which had gradually led
him from the subject of conversation.
Among different languages, even
where we cannot suspect the least
connexion or communication, it is
found, that the words, expressive of
ideas, the most compounded, do yet
nearly correspond to each other:
a certain proof that the simple
ideas, comprehended in the compound
ones, were bound together by some
universal principle, which had an
equal influence on all mankind.
19. Though it be too obvious
to escape observation, that different
ideas are connected together; I
do not find that any philosopher has
attempted to enumerate or class
all the principles of association; a
subject, however, that seems worthy
of curiosity. To me, there
appear to be only three principles
of connexion among ideas, namely,
Resemblance, Contiguity in time
or place, and Cause or Effect.
That these principles serve
to connect ideas will not, I believe, be
much doubted. A picture naturally
leads our thoughts to the original:*
the mention of one apartment in
a building naturally introduces an
enquiry or discourse concerning
the others:*(2) and if we think of a
wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting
on the pain which follows
it.*(3) But that this enumeration
is complete, and that there are no
other principles of association
except these, may be difficult to
prove to the satisfaction of the
reader, or even to a man's own
satisfaction. All we can do, in
such cases, is to run over several
instances, and examine carefully
the principle which binds the
different thoughts to each other,
never stopping till we render the
principle as general as possible.*(4)
The more instances we examine,
and the more care we employ, the
more assurance shall we acquire, that
the enumeration, which we form from
the whole, is complete and entire.
* Resemblance.
*(2) Contiguity.
*(3) Cause and effect.
*(4) For instance Contrast
or Contrariety is also a connexion
among Ideas: but it may, perhaps,
be considered as a mixture of
Causation and Resemblance. Where
two objects are contrary, the one
destroys the other; that is, the
cause of its annihilation, and the
idea of the annihilation of an object,
implies the idea of its
former existence.
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