Sect. XII. Of
the academical or sceptical Philosophy
PART I.
116. There is not a greater
number of philosophical reasonings,
displayed upon any subject, than
those, which prove the existence of a
Deity, and refute the fallacies
of Atheists; and yet the most
religious philosophers still dispute
whether any man can be so blinded
as to be a speculative atheist.
How shall we reconcile these
contradictions? The knights-errant,
who wandered about to clear the
world of dragons and giants, never
entertained the least doubt with
regard to the existence of these
monsters.
The Sceptic is another enemy
of religion, who naturally provokes the
indignation of all divines and graver
philosophers; though it is
certain, that no man ever met with
any such absurd creature, or
conversed with a man, who had no
opinion or principle concerning any
subject, either of action or speculation.
This begets a very natural
question; What is meant by a sceptic?
And how far it is possible to
push these philosophical principles
of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species of scepticism,
antecedent to all study and
philosophy, which is much inculcated
by Des Cartes and others, as a
sovereign preservative against error
and precipitate judgement. It
recommends an universal doubt, not
only of all our former opinions and
principles, but also of our very
faculties; of whose veracity, say
they, we must assure ourselves,
by a chain of reasoning, deduced
from some original principle, which
cannot possibly be fallacious or
deceitful. But neither is there
any such original principle which
has a prerogative above others,
that are self-evident and
convincing: or if there were, could
we advance a step beyond it, but
by the use of those very faculties,
of which we are supposed to be
already diffident. The Cartesian
doubt, therefore, were it ever
possible to be attained by any human
creature (as it plainly is not)
would be entirely incurable; and
no reasoning could ever bring us to a
state of assurance and conviction
upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed,
that this species of scepticism,
when more moderate, may be understood
in a very reasonable sense,
and is a necessary preparative to
the study of philosophy, by
preserving a proper impartiality
in our judgements, and weaning our
mind from all those prejudices,
which we may have imbibed from
education or rash opinion. To begin
with clear and self-evident
principles, to advance by timorous
and sure steps, to review
frequently our conclusions, and
examine accurately all their
consequences; though by these means
we shall make both a slow and a
short progress in our systems; are
the only methods, by which we can
ever hope to reach truth, and attain
a proper stability and
certainty in our determinations.
117. There is another species
of scepticism, consequent to science
and enquiry, when men are supposed
to have discovered, either the
absolute fallaciousness of their
mental faculties, or their
unfitness to reach any fixed determination
in all those curious
subjects of speculation, about which
they are commonly employed.
Even our very senses are brought
into dispute, by a certain species of
philosophers; and the maxims of
common life are subjected to the
same doubt as the most profound
principles or conclusions of
metaphysics and theology. As these
paradoxical tenets (if they may
be called tenets) are to be met
with in some philosophers, and the
refutation of them in several, they
naturally excite our curiosity,
and make us enquire into the arguments,
on which they may be founded.
I need not insist upon the
more trite topics, employed by the
sceptics in all ages, against the
evidence of sense; such as those
which are derived from the imperfection
and fallaciousness of our
organs, on numberless occasions;
the crooked appearance of an oar in
water; the various aspects of objects,
according to their different
distances; the double images which
arise from the pressing one eye;
with many other appearances of a
like nature. These sceptical
topics, indeed, are only sufficient
to prove, that the senses alone
are not implicitly to be depended
on; but that we must correct their
evidence by reason, and by considerations,
derived from the nature
of the medium, the distance of the
object, and the disposition of
the organ, in order to render them,
within their sphere, the proper
criteria of truth and falsehood.
There are other more profound
arguments against the senses, which
admit not of so easy a solution.
118. It seems evident, that
men are carried, by a natural instinct
or prepossession, to repose faith
in their senses; and that, without
any reasoning, or even almost before
the use of reason, we always
suppose an external universe, which
depends not on our perception, but
would exist, though we and every
sensible creature were absent or
annihilated. Even the animal creation
are governed by a like
opinion, and preserve this belief
of external objects, in all their
thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that,
when men follow this blind and powerful
instinct of nature, they always
suppose the very images, presented
by the senses, to be the external
objects, and never entertain any
suspicion, that the one are nothing
but representations of the
other. This very table which we
see white, and which we feel hard,
is believed to exist, independent
of our perception, and to be
something external to our mind,
which perceives it. Our presence
bestows not being on it: our absence
does not annihilate it. It
preserves its existence uniform
and entire, independent of the
situation of intelligent beings,
who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary
opinion of all men is soon
destroyed by the slightest philosophy,
which teaches us, that
nothing can ever be present to the
mind but an image or perception,
and that the senses are only the
inlets, through which these images
are conveyed, without being able
to produce any immediate
intercourse between the mind and
the object. The table, which we
see, seems to diminish, as we remove
farther from it: but the real
table, which exists independent
of us, suffers no alteration: it
was, therefore, nothing but its
image, which was present to the
mind. These are the obvious dictates
of reason; and no man, who
reflects, ever doubted, that the
existences, which we consider, when
we say, this house and that tree,
are nothing but perceptions in the
mind, and fleeting copies or representations
of other existences,
which remain uniform and independent.
119. So far, then, are we
necessitated by reasoning to contradict or
depart from the primary instincts
of nature, and to embrace a new
system with regard to the evidence
of our senses. But here
philosophy finds herself extremely
embarrassed, when she would justify
this new system, and obviate the
cavils and objections of the
sceptics. She can no longer plead
the infallible and irresistible
instinct of nature: for that led
us to a quite different system, which
is acknowledged fallible and even
erroneous. And to justify this
pretended philosophical system,
by a chain of clear and convincing
argument, or even any appearance
of argument, exceeds the power of all
human capacity.
By what argument can it be
proved, that the perceptions of the
mind must be caused by external
objects, entirely different from them,
though resembling them (if that
be possible) and could not arise
either from the energy of the mind
itself, or from the suggestion of
some invisible and unknown spirit,
or from some other cause still more
unknown to us? It is acknowledged,
that, in fact, many of these
perceptions arise not from anything
external, as in dreams, madness,
and other diseases. And nothing
can be more inexplicable than the
manner, in which body should so
operate upon mind as ever to convey an
image of itself to a substance,
supposed of so different, and even
contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact,
whether the perceptions of the senses be
produced by external objects, resembling
them: how shall this question
be determined? By experience surely;
as all other questions of a
like nature. But here experience
is, and must be entirely silent.
The mind has never anything present
to it but the perceptions, and
cannot possibly reach any experience
of their connexion with
objects. The supposition of such
a connexion is, therefore, without
any foundation in reasoning.
120. To have recourse to the
veracity of the Supreme Being, in order
to prove the veracity of our senses,
is surely making a very
unexpected circuit. If his veracity
were at all concerned in this
matter, our senses would be entirely
infallible; because it is not
possible that he can ever deceive.
Not to mention, that, if the
external world be once called in
question, we shall be at a loss to
find arguments, by which we may
prove the existence of that Being or
any of his attributes.
121. This is a topic, therefore,
in which the profounder and more
philosophical sceptics will always
triumph, when they endeavour to
introduce an universal doubt into
all subjects of human knowledge
and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts
and propensities of nature,
may they say, in assenting to the
veracity of sense? But these lead
you to believe that the very perception
or sensible image is the
external object. Do you disclaim
this principle, in order to embrace a
more rational opinion, that the
perceptions are only representations
of something external? You here
depart from your natural
propensities and more obvious sentiments;
and yet are not able to
satisfy your reason, which can never
find any convincing argument from
experience to prove, that the perceptions
are connected with any
external objects.
122. There is another sceptical
topic of a like nature, derived from
the most profound philosophy; which
might merit our attention, were it
requisite to dive so deep, in order
to discover arguments and
reasonings, which can so little
serve to any serious purpose. It is
universally allowed by modern enquirers,
that all the sensible
qualities of objects, such as hard,
soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c.
are merely secondary, and exist
not in the objects themselves, but are
perceptions of the mind, without
any external archetype or model,
which they represent. If this be
allowed, with regard to secondary
qualities, it must also follow,
with regard to the supposed primary
qualities of extension and solidity;
nor can the latter be any more
entitled to that denomination than
the former. The idea of extension
is entirely acquired from the senses
of sight and feeling; and if
all the qualities, perceived by
the senses, be in the mind, not in the
object, the same conclusion must
reach the idea of extension which
is wholly dependent on the sensible
ideas or the ideas of secondary
qualities. Nothing can save us from
this conclusion, but the
asserting, that the ideas of those
primary qualities are attained by
Abstraction, an opinion, which,
if we examine it accurately, we
shall find to be unintelligible,
and even absurd. An extension, that
is neither tangible nor visible,
cannot possibly be conceived: and a
tangible or visible extension, which
is neither hard nor soft, black
nor white, is equally beyond the
reach of human conception. Let any
man try to conceive a triangle in
general, which is neither
Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor has
any particular length or proportion of
sides; and he will soon perceive
the absurdity of all the scholastic
notions with regard to abstraction
and general ideas.*
* This argument is drawn from
Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the
writings of that very ingenious
author form the best lessons of
scepticism which are to be found
either among the ancient or modern
philosophers, Bayle not excepted.
He professes, however, in his
title page (and undoubtedly with
great truth) to have composed his
book against the sceptics as well
as against the atheists and
free-thinkers. But that all his
arguments, though otherwise
intended, are, in reality, merely
sceptical, appears from this, that
they admit of no answer and produce
no conviction. Their only effect
is to cause that momentary amazement
and irresolution and confusion,
which is the result of scepticism.
123. Thus the first philosophical
objection to the evidence of sense
or to the opinion of external existence
consists in this, that such an
opinion, if rested on natural instinct,
is contrary to reason, and
if referred to reason, is contrary
to natural instinct, and at the
same time carries no rational evidence
with it, to convince an
impartial enquirer. The second objection
goes farther, and
represents this opinion as contrary
to reason: at least, if it be a
principle of reason, that all sensible
qualities are in the mind,
not in the object. Bereave matter
of all its intelligible qualities,
both primary and secondary, you
in a manner annihilate it, and leave
only a certain unknown, inexplicable
something, as the cause of our
perceptions; a notion so imperfect,
that no sceptic will think it
worth while to contend against it.
PART II.
124. It may seem a very extravagant
attempt of the sceptics to
destroy reason by argument and ratiocination;
yet is this the grand
scope of all their enquiries and
disputes. They endeavour to find
objections, both to our abstract
reasonings, and to those which regard
matter of fact and existence.
The chief objection against
all abstract reasonings is derived
from the ideas of space and time;
ideas, which, in common life and
to a careless view, are very clear
and intelligible, but when they
pass through the scrutiny of the
profound sciences (and they are the
chief object of these sciences)
afford principles, which seem full
of absurdity and contradiction.
No priestly dogmas, invented on
purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious
reason of mankind, ever
shocked common sense more than the
doctrine of the infinitive
divisibility of extension, with
its consequences; as they are
pompously displayed by all geometricians
and metaphysicians, with a
kind of triumph and exultation.
A real quantity, infinitely less
than any finite quantity, containing
quantities infinitely less than
itself, and so on in infinitum;
this is an edifice so bold and
prodigious, that it is too weighty
for any pretended demonstration
to support, because it shocks the
clearest and most natural principles
of human reason.* But what renders
the matter more extraordinary,
is, that these seemingly absurd
opinions are supported by a chain of
reasoning, the clearest and most
natural; nor is it possible for us to
allow the premises without admitting
the consequences. Nothing can
be more convincing and satisfactory
than all the conclusions
concerning the properties of circles
and triangles; and yet, when
these are once received, how can
we deny, that the angle of contact
between a circle and its tangent
is infinitely less than any
rectilineal angle, that as you may
increase the diameter of the circle
in infinitum, this angle of contact
becomes still less, even in
infinitum, and that the angle of
contact between other curves and
their tangents may be infinitely
less than those between any circle
and its tangent, and so on, in infinitum?
The demonstration of these
principles seems as unexceptionable
as that which proves the three
angles of a triangle to be equal
to two right ones, though the
latter opinion be natural and easy,
and the former big with
contradiction and absurdity. Reason
here seems to be thrown into a
kind of amazement and suspence,
which, without the suggestions of
any sceptic, gives her a diffidence
of herself, and of the ground on
which she treads. She sees a full
light, which illuminates certain
places; but that light borders upon
the most profound darkness. And
between these she is so dazzled
and confounded, that she scarcely
can pronounce with certainty and
assurance concerning any one object.
* Whatever disputes there
may be about mathematical points, we
must allow that there are physical
points; that is, parts of
extension, which cannot be divided
or lessened, either by the eye or
imagination. These images, then,
which are present to the fancy or
senses, are absolutely indivisible,
and consequently must be allowed
by mathematicians to be infinitely
less than any real part of
extension; and yet nothing appears
more certain to reason, than that
an infinite number of them composes
an infinite extension. How much
more an infinite number of those
infinitely small parts of
extension, which are still supposed
infinitely divisible.
125. The absurdity of these
bold determinations of the abstract
sciences seems to become, if possible,
still more palpable with regard
to time than extension. An infinite
number of real parts of time,
passing in succession, and exhausted
one after another, appears so
evident a contradiction, that no
man, one should think, whose
judgement is not corrupted, instead
of being improved, by the
sciences, would ever be able to
admit of it.
Yet still reason must remain
restless, and unquiet, even with regard
to that scepticism, to which she
is driven by these seeming
absurdities and contradictions.
How any clear, distinct idea can
contain circumstances, contradictory
to itself, or to any other clear,
distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible;
and is, perhaps, as
absurd as any proposition, which
can be formed. So that nothing can be
more sceptical, or more full of
doubt and hesitation, than this
scepticism itself, which arises
from some of the paradoxical
conclusions of geometry or the science
of quantity.*
* It seems to me not impossible
to avoid these absurdities and
contradictions, if it be admitted,
that there is no such thing as
abstract or general ideas, properly
speaking; but that all general
ideas are, in reality, particular
ones, attached to a general term,
which recalls, upon occasion, other
particular ones, that resemble, in
certain circumstances, the idea,
present to the mind. Thus when the
term Horse is pronounced, we immediately
figure to ourselves the
idea of a black or a white animal,
of a particular size or figure: But
as that term is also usually applied
to animals of other colours,
figures and sizes, these ideas,
though not actually present to the
imagination, are easily recalled;
and our reasoning and conclusion
proceed in the same way, as if they
were actually present. If this
be admitted (as seems reasonable)
it follows that all the ideas of
quantity, upon which mathematicians
reason, are nothing but
particular, and such as are suggested
by the senses and imagination,
and consequently, cannot be infinitely
divisible. It is sufficient
to have dropped this hint at present,
without prosecuting it any
farther. It certainly concerns all
lovers of science not to expose
themselves to the ridicule and contempt
of the ignorant by their
conclusions; and this seems the
readiest solution of these
difficulties.
126. The sceptical objections
to moral evidence, or to the
reasonings concerning matter of
fact, are either popular or
philosophical. The popular objections
are derived from the natural
weakness of human understanding;
the contradictory opinions, which
have been entertained in different
ages and nations; the variations of
our judgement in sickness and health,
youth and old age, prosperity
and adversity; the perpetual contradiction
of each particular man's
opinions and sentiments; with many
other topics of that kind. It is
needless to insist farther on this
head. These objections are but
weak. For as, in common life, we
reason every moment concerning fact
and existence, and cannot possibly
subsist, without continually
employing this species of argument,
any popular objections, derived
from thence, must be insufficient
to destroy that evidence. The
great subverter of Pyrrhonism or
the excessive principles of
scepticism is action, and employment,
and the occupations of common
life. These principles may flourish
and triumph in the schools;
where it is, indeed, difficult,
if not impossible, to refute them. But
as soon as they leave the shade,
and by the presence of the real
objects, which actuate our passions
and sentiments, are put in
opposition to the more powerful
principles of our nature, they
vanish like smoke, and leave the
most determined sceptic in the same
condition as other mortals.
127. The sceptic, therefore,
had better keep within his proper
sphere, and display those philosophical
objections, which arise from
more profound researches. Here he
seems to have ample matter of
triumph; while he justly insists,
that all our evidence for any matter
of fact, which lies beyond the testimony
of sense or memory, is
derived entirely from the relation
of cause and effect; that we have
no other idea of this relation than
that of two objects, which have
been frequently conjoined together;
that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects, which
have, in our experience, been
frequently conjoined, will likewise,
in other instances, be
conjoined in the same manner; and
that nothing leads us to this
inference but custom or a certain
instinct of our nature; which it
is indeed difficult to resist, but
which, like other instincts, may be
fallacious and deceitful. While
the sceptic insists upon these topics,
he shows his force, or rather, indeed,
his own and our weakness; and
seems, for the time at least, to
destroy all assurance and conviction.
These arguments might be displayed
at greater length, if any durable
good or benefit to society could
ever be expected to result from them.
128. For here is the chief
and most confounding objection to
excessive scepticism, that no durable
good can ever result from it;
while it remains in its full force
and vigour. We need only ask such a
sceptic, What his meaning is? And
what he proposes by all these
curious researches? He is immediately
at a loss, and knows not what to
answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic,
who supports each his different
system of astronomy, may hope to
produce a conviction, which will
remain constant and durable, with
his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean
displays principles, which may not
be durable, but which have an
effect on conduct and behaviour.
But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect,
that his philosophy will have any
constant influence on the mind: or
if it had, that its influence would
be beneficial to society. On the
contrary, he must acknowledge, if
he will acknowledge anything, that
all human life must perish, were
his principles universally and
steadily to prevail. All discourse,
all action would immediately
cease; and men remain in a total
lethargy, till the necessities of
nature, unsatisfied, put an end
to their miserable existence. It is
true; so fatal an event is very
little to be dreaded. Nature is always
too strong for principle. And though
a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or
others into a momentary amazement
and confusion by his profound
reasonings; the first and most trivial
event in life will put to
flight all his doubts and scruples,
and leave him the same, in every
point of action and speculation,
with the philosophers of every
other sect, or with those who never
concerned themselves in any
philosophical researches. When he
awakes from his dream, he will be
the first to join in the laugh against
himself, and to confess, that
all his objections are mere amusement,
and can have no other
tendency than to show the whimsical
condition of mankind, who must act
and reason and believe; though they
are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves
concerning the foundation of
these operations, or to remove the
objections, which may be raised
against them.
PART III.
129. There is, indeed, a more
mitigated scepticism or academical
philosophy, which may be both durable
and useful, and which may, in
part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism,
or excessive scepticism,
when its undistinguished doubts
are, in some measure, corrected by
common sense and reflection. The
greater part of mankind are naturally
apt to be affirmative and dogmatical
in their opinions; and while they
see objects only on one side, and
have no idea of any counterpoising
argument, they throw themselves
precipitately into the principles,
to which they are inclined; nor
have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite sentiments. To
hesitate or balance perplexes
their understanding, checks their
passion, and suspends their
action. They are, therefore, impatient
till they escape from a
state, which to them is so uneasy:
and they think, that they could
never remove themselves far enough
from it, by the violence of their
affirmations and obstinacy of their
belief. But could such
dogmatical reasoners become sensible
of the strange infirmities of
human understanding, even in its
most perfect state, and when most
accurate and cautious in its determinations;
such a reflection would
naturally inspire them with more
modesty and reserve, and diminish
their fond opinion of themselves,
and their prejudice against
antagonists. The illiterate may
reflect on the disposition of the
learned, who, amidst all the advantages
of study and reflection, are
commonly still diffident in their
determinations: and if any of the
learned be inclined, from their
natural temper, to haughtiness and
obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism
might abate their pride,
by showing them, that the few advantages,
which they may have attained
over their fellows, are but inconsiderable,
if compared with the
universal perplexity and confusion,
which is inherent in human nature.
In general, there is a degree of
doubt, and caution, and modesty,
which, in all kinds of scrutiny
and decision, ought for ever to
accompany a just reasoner.
130. Another species of mitigated
scepticism which may be of
advantage to mankind, and which
may be the natural result of the
Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples,
is the limitation of our enquiries
to such subjects as are best adapted
to the narrow capacity of human
understanding. The imagination of
man is naturally sublime,
delighted with whatever is remote
and extraordinary, and running,
without control, into the most distant
parts of space and time in
order to avoid the objects, which
custom has rendered too familiar
to it. A correct Judgement observes
a contrary method, and avoiding
all distant and high enquiries,
confines itself to common life, and to
such subjects as fall under daily
practice and experience; leaving the
more sublime topics to the embellishment
of poets and orators, or to
the arts of priests and politicians.
To bring us to so salutary a
determination, nothing can be more
serviceable, than to be once
thoroughly convinced of the force
of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of
the impossibility, that anything,
but the strong power of natural
instinct, could free us from it.
Those who have a propensity to
philosophy, will still continue
their researches; because they
reflect, that, besides the immediate
pleasure, attending such an
occupation, philosophical decisions
are nothing but the reflections of
common life, methodized and corrected.
But they will never be
tempted to go beyond common life,
so long as they consider the
imperfection of those faculties
which they employ, their narrow reach,
and their inaccurate operations.
While we cannot give a satisfactory
reason, why we believe, after a
thousand experiments, that a stone
will fall, or fire burn; can we
ever satisfy ourselves concerning
any determination, which we may
form, with regard to the origin of
worlds, and the situation of nature,
from, and to eternity?
This narrow limitation, indeed,
of our enquiries, is, in every
respect, so reasonable, that it
suffices to make the slightest
examination into the natural powers
of the human mind and to compare
them with their objects, in order
to recommend it to us. We shall then
find what are the proper subjects
of science and enquiry.
131. It seems to me, that
the only objects of the abstract science
or of demonstration are quantity
and number, and that all attempts
to extend this more perfect species
of knowledge beyond these bounds
are mere sophistry and illusion.
As the component parts of quantity
and number are entirely similar,
their relations become intricate
and involved; and nothing can be
more curious, as well as useful, than
to trace, by a variety of mediums,
their equality or inequality,
through their different appearances.
But as all other ideas are
clearly distinct and different from
each other, we can never advance
farther, by our utmost scrutiny,
than to observe this diversity,
and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce
one thing not to be
another. Or if there be any difficulty
in these decisions, it proceeds
entirely from the undeterminate
meaning of words, which is corrected
by juster definitions. That the
square of the hypothenuse is equal
to the squares of the other two
sides, cannot be known, let the
terms be ever so exactly defined,
without a train of reasoning and
enquiry. But to convince us of this
proposition, that where there is
no property, there can be no injustice,
it is only necessary to define
the terms, and explain injustice
to be a violation of property. This
proposition is, indeed, nothing
but a more imperfect definition. It is
the same case with all those pretended
syllogistical reasonings, which
may be found in every other branch
of learning, except the sciences of
quantity and number; and these may
safely, I think, be pronounced
the only proper objects of knowledge
and demonstration.
132. All other enquiries of
men regard only matter of fact and
existence; and these are evidently
incapable of demonstration.
Whatever is may not be. No negation
of a fact can involve a
contradiction. The non-existence
of any being, without exception, is
as clear and distinct an idea as
its existence. The proposition, which
affirms it not to be, however false,
is no less conceivable and
intelligible, than that which affirms
it to be. The case is
different with the sciences, properly
so called. Every proposition,
which is not true, is there confused
and unintelligible. That the cube
root of 64 is equal to the half
of 10, is a false proposition, and can
never be distinctly conceived. But
that Caesar, or the angel
Gabriel, or any being never existed,
may be a false proposition, but
still is perfectly conceivable,
and implies no contradiction.
The existence, therefore,
of any being can only be proved by
arguments from its cause or its
effect; and these arguments are
founded entirely on experience.
If we reason a priori, anything may
appear able to produce anything.
The falling of a pebble may, for
aught we know, extinguish the sun;
or the wish of a man control the
planets in their orbits. It is only
experience, which teaches us the
nature and bounds of cause and effect,
and enables us to infer the
existence of one object from that
of another.* Such is the
foundation of moral reasoning, which
forms the greater part of human
knowledge, and is the source of
all human action and behaviour.
* That impious maxim of the
ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihil
fit, by which the creation of matter
was excluded, ceases to be a
maxim, according to this philosophy.
Not only the will of the
supreme Being may create matter;
but, for aught we know a priori,
the will of any other being might
create it, or any other cause,
that the most whimsical imagination
can assign.
Moral reasonings are either
concerning particular or general
facts. All deliberations in life
regard the former; as also all
disquisitions in history, chronology,
geography, and astronomy.
The sciences, which treat
of general facts, are politics, natural
philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c.
where the qualities, causes and
effects of a whole species of objects
are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it
proves the existence of a Deity, and the
immortality of souls, is composed
partly of reasonings concerning
particular, partly concerning general
facts. It has a foundation in
reason, so far as it is supported
by experience. But its best and most
solid foundation is faith and divine
revelation.
Morals and criticism are not
so properly objects of the
understanding as of taste and sentiment.
Beauty, whether moral or
natural, is felt, more properly
than perceived. Or if we reason
concerning it, and endeavor to fix
its standard, we regard a new fact,
to wit, the general tastes of mankind,
or some such fact, which may be
the object of reasoning and enquiry.
When we run over libraries,
persuaded of these principles, what
havoc must we make? If we take in
our hand any volume; of divinity
or school metaphysics, for instance;
let us ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity
or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental reasoning
concerning matter of fact and
existence? No. Commit it then to
the flames: for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.
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