Sect. X. Of Miracles
PART I.
86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson's
writings, an argument against the
real presence, which is as concise,
and elegant, and strong as any
argument can possibly be supposed
against a doctrine, so little worthy
of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged
on all hands, says that
learned prelate, that the authority,
either of the scripture or of
tradition, is founded merely in
the testimony of the apostles, who
were eye-witnesses to those miracles
of our Saviour, by which he
proved his divine mission. Our evidence,
then, for the truth of the
Christian religion is less than
the evidence for the truth of our
senses; because, even in the first
authors of our religion, it was
no greater; and it is evident it
must diminish in passing from them to
their disciples; nor can any one
rest such confidence in their
testimony, as in the immediate object
of his senses. But a weaker
evidence can never destroy a stronger;
and therefore, were the
doctrine of the real presence ever
so clearly revealed in scripture,
it were directly contrary to the
rules of just reasoning to give our
assent to it. It contradicts sense,
though both the scripture and
tradition, on which it is supposed
to be built, carry not such
evidence with them as sense; when
they are considered merely as
external evidences, and are not
brought home to every one's breast, by
the immediate operation of the Holy
Spirit.
Nothing is so convenient as
a decisive argument of this kind,
which must at least silence the
most arrogant bigotry and
superstition, and free us from their
impertinent solicitations. I
flatter myself, that I have discovered
an argument of a like nature,
which, if just, will, with the wise
and learned, be an everlasting
check to all kinds of superstitious
delusion, and consequently, will
be useful as long as the world endures.
For so long, I presume, will
the accounts of miracles and prodigies
be found in all history, sacred
and profane.
87. Though experience be our
only guide in reasoning concerning
matters of fact; it must be acknowledged,
that this guide is not
altogether infallible, but in some
cases is apt to lead us into
errors. One, who in our climate,
should expect better weather in any
week of June than in one of December,
would reason justly, and
conformably to experience; but it
is certain, that he may happen, in
the event, to find himself mistaken.
However, we may observe, that, in
such a case, he would have no cause
to complain of experience; because
it commonly informs us beforehand
of the uncertainty, by that
contrariety of events, which we
may learn from a diligent observation.
All effects follow not with like
certainty from their supposed causes.
Some events are found, in all countries
and all ages, to have been
constantly conjoined together: Others
are found to have been more
variable, and sometimes to disappoint
our expectations; so that, in
our reasonings concerning matter
of fact, there are all imaginable
degrees of assurance, from the highest
certainty to the lowest species
of moral evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions
his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are founded
on an infallible experience, he
expects the event with the last
degree of assurance, and regards his
past experience as a full proof
of the future existence of that event.
In other cases, he proceeds with
more caution: He weighs the
opposite experiments: He considers
which side is supported by the
greater number of experiments: to
that side he inclines, with doubt
and hesitation; and when at last
he fixes his judgement, the
evidence exceeds not what we properly
call probability. All
probability, then, supposes an opposition
of experiments and
observations, where the one side
is found to overbalance the other,
and to produce a degree of evidence,
proportioned to the
superiority. A hundred instances
or experiments on one side, and fifty
on another, afford a doubtful expectation
of any event; though a
hundred uniform experiments, with
only one that is contradictory,
reasonably beget a pretty strong
degree of assurance. In all cases, we
must balance the opposite experiments,
where they are opposite, and
deduct the smaller number from the
greater, in order to know the exact
force of the superior evidence.
88. To apply these principles
to a particular instance; we may
observe that there is no species
of reasoning more common, more
useful, and even necessary to human
life, than that which is derived
from the testimony of men, and the
reports of eye-witnesses and
spectators. This species of reasoning,
perhaps, one may deny to be
founded on the relation of cause
and effect. I shall not dispute about
a word. It will be sufficient to
observe that our assurance in any
argument of this kind is derived
from no other principle than our
observation of the veracity of human
testimony, and of the usual
conformity of facts to the reports
of witnesses. It being a general
maxim, that no objects have any
discoverable connexion together, and
that all the inferences, which we
can draw from one to another, are
founded merely on our experience
of their constant and regular
conjunction; it is evident that
we ought not to make an exception to
this maxim in favour of human testimony,
whose connexion with any
event seems, in itself, as little
necessary as any other. Were not the
memory tenacious to a certain degree;
had not men commonly an
inclination to truth and a principle
of probity; were they not
sensible to shame, when detected
in a falsehood: Were not these, I
say, discovered by experience to
be qualities, inherent in human
nature, we should never repose the
least confidence in human
testimony. A man delirious, or noted
for falsehood and villany, has no
manner of authority with us.
And as the evidence, derived
from witnesses and human testimony,
is founded on past experience, so
it varies with the experience, and
is regarded either as a proof or
a probability, according as the
conjunction between any particular
kind of report and any kind of
object has been found to be constant
or variable. There are a number
of circumstances to be taken into
consideration in all judgements of
this kind; and the ultimate standard,
by which we determine all
disputes, that may arise concerning
them, is always derived from
experience and observation. Where
this experience is not entirely
uniform on any side, it is attended
with an unavoidable contrariety in
our judgements, and with the same
opposition and mutual destruction of
argument as in every other kind
of evidence. We frequently hesitate
concerning the reports of others.
We balance the opposite
circumstances, which cause any doubt
or uncertainty; and when we
discover a superiority on any side,
we incline to it; but still with a
diminution of assurance, in proportion
to the force of its antagonist.
89. This contrariety of evidence,
in the present case, may be
derived from several different causes;
from the opposition of contrary
testimony; from the character or
number of the witnesses; from the
manner of their delivering their
testimony; or from the union of all
these circumstances. We entertain
a suspicion concerning any matter of
fact, when the witnesses contradict
each other; when they are but few,
or of a doubtful character; when
they have an interest in what they
affirm; when they deliver their
testimony with hesitation, or on the
contrary, with too violent asseverations.
There are many other
particulars of the same kind, which
may diminish or destroy the
force of any argument, derived from
human testimony.
Suppose, for instance, that
the fact, which the testimony endeavours
to establish, partakes of the extraordinary
and the marvellous; in
that case, the evidence, resulting
from the testimony, admits of a
diminution, greater or less, in
proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason why we place
any credit in witnesses and
historians, is not derived from
any connexion, which we perceive a
priori, between testimony and reality,
but because we are accustomed
to find a conformity between them.
But when the fact attested is
such a one as has seldom fallen
under our observation, here is a
contest of two opposite experiences;
of which the one destroys the
other, as far as its force goes,
and the superior can only operate
on the mind by the force, which
remains. The very same principle of
experience, which gives us a certain
degree of assurance in the
testimony of witnesses, gives us
also, in this case, another degree of
assurance against the fact, which
they endeavour to establish; from
which contradiction there necessarily
arises a counterpoize, and
mutual destruction of belief and
authority.
I should not believe such
a story were it told me by Cato, was a
proverbial saying in Rome, even
during the lifetime of that
philosophical patriot.* The incredibility
of a fact, it was allowed,
might invalidate so great an authority.
* Plutarch, Marcus Cato.
The Indian prince, who refused
to believe the first relations
concerning the effects of frost,
reasoned justly; and it naturally
required very strong testimony to
engage his assent to facts, that
arose from a state of nature, with
which he was unacquainted, and
which bore so little analogy to
those events, of which he had had
constant and uniform experience.
Though they were not contrary to
his experience, they were not conformable
to it.*
* No Indian, it is evident,
could have experience that water did not
freeze in cold climates. This is
placing nature in a situation quite
unknown to him; and it is impossible
for him to tell a priori what
will result from it. It is making
a new experiment, the consequence of
which is always uncertain. One may
sometimes conjecture from analogy
what will follow; but still this
is but conjecture. And it must be
confessed, that, in the present
case of freezing, the event follows
contrary to the rules of analogy,
and is such as a rational Indian
would not look for. The operations
of cold upon water are not gradual,
according to the degrees of cold;
but whenever it comes to the
freezing point, the water passes
in a moment, from the utmost
liquidity to perfect hardness. Such
an event, therefore, may be
denominated extraordinary, and requires
a pretty strong testimony to
render it credible to people in
a war climate: But still it is not
miraculous, nor contrary to uniform
experience of the course of nature
in cases where all the circumstances
are the same. The inhabitants
of Sumatra have always seen water
fluid in their own climate, and
the freezing of their rivers ought
to be deemed a prodigy: But they
never saw water in Muscovy during
the winter; and therefore they
cannot reasonably be positive what
would there be the consequence.
90. But in order to encrease
the probability against the testimony
of witnesses, let us suppose, that
the fact, which they affirm,
instead of being only marvellous,
is really miraculous; and suppose
also, that the testimony considered
apart and in itself, amounts to an
entire proof; in that case, there
is proof against proof, of which the
strongest must prevail, but still
with a diminution of its force, in
proportion to that of its antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of
the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established
these laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of
the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly
be imagined. Why is it more than
probable, that all men must die;
that lead cannot, of itself, remain
suspended in the air; that fire
consumes wood, and is extinguished
by water; unless it be, that these
events are found agreeable to the
laws of nature, and there is required
a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to prevent
them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle,
if it ever happen in the common
course of nature. It is no miracle
that a man, seemingly in good health,
should die on a sudden:
because such a kind of death, though
more unusual than any other,
has yet been frequently observed
to happen. But it is a miracle,
that a dead man should come to life;
because that has never been
observed in any age or country.
There must, therefore, be a uniform
experience against every miraculous
event, otherwise the event would
not merit that appellation. And
as a uniform experience amounts to a
proof, there is here a direct and
full proof, from the nature of the
fact, against the existence of any
miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle rendered
credible, but by an opposite proof,
which is superior.*
* Sometimes an event may not,
in itself, seem to be contrary to
the laws of nature, and yet, if
it were real, it might, by reason of
some circumstances, be denominated
a miracle; because, in fact, it
is contrary to these laws. Thus
if a person, claiming a divine
authority, should command a sick
person to be well, a healthful man to
fall down dead, the clouds to pour
rain, the winds to blow, in
short, should order many natural
events, which immediately follow upon
his command; these might justly
be esteemed miracles, because they are
really, in this case, contrary to
the laws of nature. For if any
suspicion remain, that the event
and command concurred by accident,
there is no miracle and no transgression
of the laws of nature. If
this suspicion be removed, there
is evidently a miracle, and a
transgression of these laws; because
nothing can be more contrary to
nature than that the voice or command
of a man should have such an
influence. A miracle may be accurately
defined, a transgression of a
law of nature by a particular volition
of the Deity, or by the
interposition of some invisible
agent. A miracle may either be
discoverable by men or not. This
alters not its nature and essence.
The raising of a house or ship into
the air is a visible miracle.
The raising of a feather, when the
wind wants ever so little of a
force requisite for that purpose,
is as real a miracle, though not
so sensible with regard to us.
91. The plain consequence
is (and it is a general maxim worthy of
our attention), "That no testimony
is sufficient to establish a
miracle, unless the testimony be
of such a kind, that its falsehood
would be more miraculous, than the
fact, which it endeavours to
establish; and even in that case
there is a mutual destruction of
arguments, and the superior only
gives us an assurance suitable to
that degree of force, which remains,
after deducting the inferior."
When anyone tells me, that he saw
a dead man restored to life, I
immediately consider with myself,
whether it be more probable, that
this person should either deceive
or be deceived, or that the fact,
which he relates, should really
have happened. I weigh the one miracle
against the other; and according
to the superiority, which I discover,
I pronounce my decision, and always
reject the greater miracle. If the
falsehood of his testimony would
be more miraculous, than the event
which he relates; then, and not
till then, can he pretend to command
my belief or opinion.
PART II.
92. In the foregoing reasoning
we have supposed that the
testimony, upon which a miracle
is founded, may possibly amount to
an entire proof, and that the falsehood
of that testimony would be a
real prodigy: But it is easy to
shew that we have been a great deal
too liberal in our concession, and
that there never was a miraculous
event established on so full an
evidence.
For first, there is not to
be found, in all history, any miracle
attested by a sufficient number
of men, of such unquestioned
good-sense, education, and learning,
as to secure us against all
delusion in themselves; of such
undoubted integrity, as to place
them beyond all suspicion of any
design to deceive others; of such
credit and reputation in the eyes
of mankind, as to have a great
deal to lose in case of their being
detected in any falsehood; and
at the same time, attesting facts
performed in such a public manner
and in so celebrated a part of the
world, as to render the detection
unavoidable: All which circumstances
are requisite to give us a full
assurance in the testimony of men.
93. Secondly. We may observe
in human nature a principle which, if
strictly examined, will be found
to diminish extremely the
assurance, which we might, from
human testimony, have, in any kind
of prodigy. The maxim, by which
we commonly conduct ourselves in our
reasonings, is, that the objects,
of which we have no experience,
resemble those, of which we have;
that what we have found to be most
usual is always most probable; and
that where there is an opposition
of arguments, we ought to give the
preference to such as are founded
on the greatest number of past observations.
But though, in proceeding
by this rule, we readily reject
any fact which is unusual and
incredible in an ordinary degree;
yet in advancing farther, the mind
observes not always the same rule;
but when anything is affirmed
utterly absurd and miraculous, it
rather the more readily admits of
such a fact, upon account of that
very circumstance, which ought to
destroy all its authority. The passion
of surprise and wonder, arising
from miracles, being an agreeable
emotion, gives a sensible tendency
towards the belief of those events,
from which it is derived. And this
goes so far, that even those who
cannot enjoy this pleasure
immediately, nor can believe those
miraculous events, of which they
are informed, yet love to partake
of the satisfaction at second-hand
or by rebound, and place a pride
and delight in exciting the
admiration of others.
With what greediness are the
miraculous accounts of travellers
received, their descriptions of
sea and land monsters, their relations
of wonderful adventures, strange
men, and uncouth manners? But if
the spirit of religion join itself
to the love of wonder, there is
an end of common sense; and human
testimony, in these circumstances,
loses all pretensions to authority.
A religionist may be an
enthusiast, and imagine he sees
what has no reality: he may know his
narrative to be false, and yet persevere
in it, with the best
intentions in the world, for the
sake of promoting so holy a cause: or
even where this delusion has not
place, vanity, excited by so strong a
temptation, operates on him more
powerfully than on the rest of
mankind in any other circumstances;
and self-interest with equal
force. His auditors may not have,
and commonly have not, sufficient
judgement to canvass his evidence:
what judgement they have, they
renounce by principle, in these
sublime and mysterious subjects: or if
they were ever so willing to employ
it, passion and a heated
imagination disturb the regularity
of its operations. Their
credulity increases his impudence:
and his impudence overpowers
their credulity.
Eloquence, when at its highest
pitch, leaves little room for
reason or reflection; but addressing
itself entirely to the fancy or
the affections, captivates the willing
hearers, and subdues their
understanding. Happily, this pitch
it seldom attains. But what a Tully
or a Demosthenes could scarcely
effect over a Roman or Athenian
audience, every Capuchin, every
itinerant or stationary teacher can
perform over the generality of mankind,
and in a higher degree, by
touching such gross and vulgar passions.
The many instances of forged
miracles, and prophecies, and
supernatural events, which, in all
ages, have either been detected
by contrary evidence, or which detect
themselves by their absurdity,
prove sufficiently the strong propensity
of mankind to the
extraordinary and the marvellous,
and ought reasonably to beget a
suspicion against all relations
of this kind. This is our natural
way of thinking, even with regard
to the most common and most credible
events. For instance: There is no
kind of report which rises so
easily, and spreads so quickly,
especially in country places and
provincial towns, as those concerning
marriages; insomuch that two
young persons of equal condition
never see each other twice, but the
whole neighbourhood immediately
join them together. The pleasure of
telling a piece of news so interesting,
of propagating it, and of
being the first reporters of it,
spreads the intelligence. And this is
so well known, that no man of sense
gives attention to these
reports, till he find them confirmed
by some greater evidence. Do
not the same passions, and others
still stronger, incline the
generality of mankind to believe
and report, with the greatest
vehemence and assurance, all religious
miracles?
94. Thirdly. It forms a strong
presumption against all
supernatural and miraculous relations,
that they are observed
chiefly to abound among ignorant
and barbarous nations; or if a
civilized people has ever given
admission to any of them, that
people will be found to have received
them from ignorant and barbarous
ancestors, who transmitted them
with that inviolable sanction and
authority, which always attend received
opinions. When we peruse the
first histories of all nations,
we are apt to imagine ourselves
transported into some new world;
where the whole frame of nature is
disjointed, and every element performs
its operations in a different
manner, from what it does at present.
Battles, revolutions,
pestilence, famine and death, are
never the effect of those natural
causes, which we experience. Prodigies,
omens, oracles, judgements,
quite obscure the few natural events,
that are intermingled with them.
But as the former grow thinner every
page, in proportion as we advance
nearer the enlightened ages, we
soon learn, that there is nothing
mysterious or supernatural in the
case, but that all proceeds from the
usual propensity of mankind towards
the marvellous, and that, though
this inclination may at intervals
receive a check from sense and
learning, it can never be thoroughly
extirpated from human nature.
It is strange, a judicious
reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of
these wonderful historians, that
such prodigious events never happen
in our days. But it is nothing strange,
I hope, that men should lie in
all ages. You must surely have seen
instances enough of that
frailty. You have yourself heard
many such marvellous relations
started, which, being treated with
scorn by all the wise and
judicious, have at last been abandoned
even by the vulgar. Be assured,
that those renowned lies, which
have spread and flourished to such a
monstrous height, arose from like
beginnings; but being sown in a more
proper soil, shot up at last into
prodigies almost equal to those
which they relate.
It was a wise policy in that
false prophet, Alexander, who though
now forgotten, was once so famous,
to lay the first scene of his
impostures in Paphlagonia, where,
as Lucian tells us, the people
were extremely ignorant and stupid,
and ready to swallow even the
grossest delusion. People at a distance,
who are weak enough to
think the matter at all worth enquiry,
have no opportunity of
receiving better information. The
stories come magnified to them by
a hundred circumstances. Fools are
industrious in propagating the
imposture; while the wise and learned
are contented, in general, to
deride its absurdity, without informing
themselves of the particular
facts, by which it may be distinctly
refuted. And thus the impostor
above mentioned was enabled to proceed,
from his ignorant
Paphlagonians, to the enlisting
of votaries, even among the Grecian
philosophers, and men of the most
eminent rank and distinction in
Rome: nay, could engage the attention
of that sage emperor Marcus
Aurelius; so far as to make him
trust the success of a military
expedition to his delusive prophecies.
The advantages are so great,
of starting an imposture among an
ignorant people, that, even though
the delusion should be too gross to
impose on the generality of them
(which, though seldom, is sometimes
the case) it has a much better chance
for succeeding in remote
countries, than if the first scene
had been laid in a city renowned
for arts and knowledge. The most
ignorant and barbarous of these
barbarians carry the report abroad.
None of their countrymen have a
large correspondence, or sufficient
credit and authority to contradict
and beat down the delusion. Men's
inclination to the marvellous has
full opportunity to display itself.
And thus a story, which is
universally exploded in the place
where it was first started, shall
pass for certain at a thousand miles
distance. But had Alexander fixed
his residence at Athens, the philosophers
of that renowned mart of
learning had immediately spread,
throughout the whole Roman empire,
their sense of the matter; which,
being supported by so great
authority, and displayed by all
the force of reason and eloquence, had
entirely opened the eyes of mankind.
It is true; Lucian, passing by
chance through Paphlagonia, had
an opportunity of performing this good
office. But, though much to be wished,
it does not always happen, that
every Alexander meets with a Lucian,
ready to expose and detect his
impostures.
95. I may add as a fourth
reason, which diminishes the authority
of prodigies, that there is no testimony
for any, even those which
have not been expressly detected,
that is not opposed by an infinite
number of witnesses; so that not
only the miracle destroys the
credit of testimony, but the testimony
destroys itself. To make this
the better understood, let us consider,
that, in matters of
religion, whatever is different
is contrary; and that it is impossible
the religions of ancient Rome, of
Turkey, of Siam, and of China
should, all of them, be established
on any solid foundation. Every
miracle, therefore, pretended to
have been wrought in any of these
religions (and all of them abound
in miracles), as its direct scope is
to establish the particular system
to which it is attributed; so has
it the same force, though more indirectly,
to overthrow every other
system. In destroying a rival system,
it likewise destroys the
credit of those miracles, on which
that system was established; so
that all the prodigies of different
religions are to be regarded as
contrary facts, and the evidences
of these prodigies, whether weak
or strong, as opposite to each other.
According to this method of
reasoning, when we believe any miracle
of Mahomet or his successors,
we have for our warrant the testimony
of a few barbarous Arabians: And
on the other hand, we are to regard
the authority of Titus Livius,
Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short,
of all the authors and witnesses,
Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic,
who have related any miracle
in their particular religion; I
say, we are to regard their
testimony in the same light as if
they had mentioned that Mahometan
miracle, and had in express terms
contradicted it, with the same
certainty as they have for the miracle
they relate. This argument
may appear over subtile and refined;
but is not in reality different
from the reasoning of a judge, who
supposes that the credit of two
witnesses, maintaining a crime against
any one, is destroyed by the
testimony of two others, who affirm
him to have been two hundred
leagues distant, at the same instant
when the crime is said to have
been committed.
96. One of the best attested
miracles in all profane history, is
that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian,
who cured a blind man in
Alexandria, by means of his spittle,
and a lame man by the mere
touch of his foot; in obedience
to a vision of the god Serapis, who
had enjoined them to have recourse
to the Emperor, for these
miraculous cures. The story may
be seen in that fine historian;* where
every circumstance seems to add
weight to the testimony, and might
be displayed at large with all the
force of argument and eloquence, if
any one were now concerned to enforce
the evidence of that exploded
and idolatrous superstition. The
gravity, solidity, age, and probity
of so great an emperor, who, through
the whole course of his life,
conversed in a familiar manner with
his friends and courtiers, and
never affected those extraordinary
airs of divinity assumed by
Alexander and Demetrius. The historian,
a contemporary writer, noted
for candour and veracity, and withal,
the greatest and most
penetrating genius, perhaps, of
all antiquity; and so free from any
tendency to credulity, that he even
lies under the contrary
imputation, of atheism and profaneness:
The persons, from whose
authority he related the miracle,
of established character for
judgement and veracity, as we may
well presume; eye-witnesses of the
fact, and confirming their testimony,
after the Flavian family was
despoiled of the empire, and could
no longer give any reward, as the
price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfuere,
nunc quoque memorant,
postquam nullum mendacio pretium.
To which if we add the public nature
of the facts, as related, it will
appear, that no evidence can well be
supposed stronger for so gross and
so palpable a falsehood.
* Histories, iv. 81. Suetonius
gives nearly the same account,
Lives of the Caesars (Vespasian).
There is also a memorable
story related by Cardinal de Retz, which
may well deserve our consideration.
When that intriguing politician
fled into Spain, to avoid the persecution
of his enemies, he passed
through Saragossa, the capital of
Aragon, where he was shewn, in the
cathedral, a man, who had served
seven years as a doorkeeper, and
was well known to every body in
town, that had ever paid his devotions
at that church. He had been seen,
for so long a time, wanting a leg;
but recovered that limb by the rubbing
of holy oil upon the stump; and
the cardinal assures us that he
saw him with two legs. This miracle
was vouched by all the canons of
the church; and the whole company
in town were appealed to for a confirmation
of the fact; whom the
cardinal found, by their zealous
devotion, to be thorough believers of
the miracle. Here the relater was
also contemporary to the supposed
prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine
character, as well as of
great genius; the miracle of so
singular a nature as could scarcely
admit of a counterfeit, and the
witnesses very numerous, and all of
them, in a manner, spectators of
the fact, to which they gave their
testimony. And what adds mightily
to the force of the evidence, and
may double our surprise on this
occasion, is, that the cardinal
himself, who relates the story,
seems not to give any credit to it,
and consequently cannot be suspected
of any concurrence in the holy
fraud. He considered justly, that
it was not requisite, in order to
reject a fact of this nature, to
be able accurately to disprove the
testimony, and to trace its falsehood,
through all the circumstances
of knavery and credulity which produced
it. He knew, that, as this was
commonly altogether impossible at
any small distance of time and
place; so was it extremely difficult,
even where one was immediately
present, by reason of the bigotry,
ignorance, cunning, and roguery
of a great part of mankind. He therefore
concluded, like a just
reasoner, that such an evidence
carried falsehood upon the very face
of it, and that a miracle, supported
by any human testimony, was
more properly a subject of derision
than of argument.
There surely never was a greater
number of miracles ascribed to
one person, than those, which were
lately said to have been wrought in
France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris,
the famous Jansenist, with whose
sanctity the people were so long
deluded. The curing of the sick,
giving hearing to the deaf, and
sight to the blind, were every where
talked of as the usual effects of
that holy sepulchre. But what is
more extraordinary; many of the
miracles were immediately proved
upon the spot, before judges of
unquestioned integrity, attested by
witnesses of credit and distinction,
in a learned age, and on the most
eminent theatre that is now in the
world. Nor is this all: a
relation of them was published and
dispersed every where; nor were the
Jesuits, though a learned body,
supported by the civil magistrate, and
determined enemies to those opinions,
in whose favour the miracles
were said to have been wrought,
ever able distinctly to refute or
detect them. Where shall we find
such a number of circumstances,
agreeing to the corroboration of
one fact? And what have we to
oppose to such a cloud of witnesses,
but the absolute impossibility or
miraculous nature of the events,
which they relate? And this surely,
in the eyes of all reasonable people,
will alone be regarded as a
sufficient refutation.
97. Is the consequence just,
because some human testimony has the
utmost force and authority in some
cases, when it relates the battle
of Philippi or Pharsalia for instance;
that therefore all kinds of
testimony must, in all cases, have
equal force and authority?
Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian
factions had, each of them,
claimed the victory in these battles,
and that the historians of
each party had uniformly ascribed
the advantage to their own side; how
could mankind, at this distance,
have been able to determine between
them? The contrariety is equally
strong between the miracles related
by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those
delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any
monkish historian.
The wise lend a very academic
faith to every report which favours
the passion of the reporter; whether
it magnifies his country, his
family, or himself, or in any other
way strikes in with his natural
inclinations and propensities. But
what greater temptation than to
appear a missionary, a prophet,
an ambassador from heaven? Who would
not encounter many dangers and difficulties,
in order to attain so
sublime a character? Or if, by the
help of vanity and a heated
imagination, a man has first made
a convert of himself, and entered
seriously into the delusion I who
ever scruples to make use of pious
frauds, in support of so holy and
meritorious a cause?
The smallest spark may here
kindle into the greatest flame;
because the materials are always
prepared for it. The avidum genus
auricularum,* the gazing populace,
receive greedily, without
examination, whatever sooths superstition,
and promotes wonder.
* Lucretius.
How many stories of this nature
have in all ages, been detected
and exploded in their infancy? How
many more have been celebrated
for a time, and have afterwards
sunk into neglect and oblivion?
Where such reports, therefore, fly
about, the solution of the
phenomenon is obvious; and we in
conformity to regular experience
and observation, when we account
for it by the known and natural
principles of credulity and delusion.
And shall we, rather than have a
recourse to so natural a solution,
allow of a miraculous violation
of the most established laws of
nature?
I need not mention the difficulty
of detecting a falsehood in any
private or even public history,
at the place, where it is said to
happen; much more when the scene
is removed to ever so small a
distance. Even a court of judicature,
with all the authority,
accuracy, and judgement, which they
can employ, find themselves
often at a loss to distinguish between
truth and falsehood in the most
recent actions. But the matter never
comes to any issue, if trusted to
the common method of altercations
and debate and flying rumours;
especially when men's passions have
taken part on either side.
In the infancy of new religions,
the wise and learned commonly
esteem the matter too inconsiderable
to deserve their attention or
regard. And when afterwards they
would willingly detect the cheat,
in order to undeceive the deluded
multitude, the season is now past,
and the records and witnesses, which
might clear up the matter, have
perished beyond recovery.
No means of detection remain,
but those which must be drawn from the
very testimony itself of the reporters:
and these, though always
sufficient with the judicious and
knowing, are commonly too fine to
fall under the comprehension of
the vulgar.
98. Upon the whole, then,
it appears, that no testimony for any kind
of miracle has ever amounted to
a probability, much less to a proof;
and that, even supposing it amounted
to a proof, it would be opposed
by another proof, derived from the
very nature of the fact, which it
would endeavour to establish. It
is experience only, which gives
authority to human testimony; and
it is the same experience, which
assures us of the laws of nature.
When, therefore, these two kinds
of experience are contrary, we have
nothing to do but substract the
one from the other, and embrace
an opinion, either on one side or
the other, with that assurance which
arises from the remainder. But
according to the principle here
explained, this substraction, with
regard to all popular religions,
amounts to an entire annihilation;
and therefore we may establish it
as a maxim, that no human
testimony can have such force as
to prove a miracle, and make it a
just foundation for any such system
of religion.
99. I beg the limitations
here made may be remarked, when I say,
that a miracle can never be proved,
so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. For I own, that
otherwise, there may possibly be
miracles, or violations of the usual
course of nature, of such a
kind as to admit of proof from human
testimony; though, perhaps, it
will be impossible to find any such
in all the records of history.
Thus, suppose all authors, in all
languages, agree, that, from the
first of January 1600, there was
a total darkness over the whole earth
for eight days: suppose that the
tradition of this extraordinary event
is still strong and lively among
the people: that all travellers,
who return from foreign countries,
bring us accounts of the same
tradition, without the least variation
or contradiction: it is
evident, that our present philosophers,
instead of doubting the
fact, ought to receive it as certain,
and ought to search for the
causes whence it might be derived.
The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature, is an event
rendered probable by so many
analogies, that any phenomenon,
which seems to have a tendency towards
that catastrophe, comes within the
reach of human testimony, if that
testimony be very extensive and
uniform.
But suppose, that all the
historians who treat of England, should
agree, that, on the first of January
1600, Queen Elizabeth died;
that both before and after her death
she was seen by her physicians
and the whole court, as is usual
with persons of her rank; that her
successor was acknowledged and proclaimed
by the parliament; and that,
after being interred a month, she
again appeared, resumed the
throne, and governed England for
three years: I must confess that I
should be surprised at the concurrence
of so many odd circumstances,
but should not have the least inclination
to believe so miraculous
an event. I should not doubt of
her pretended death, and of those
other public circumstances that
followed it: I should only assert it
to have been pretended, and that
it neither was, nor possibly could be
real. You would in vain object to
me the difficulty, and almost
impossibility of deceiving the world
in an affair of such consequence;
the wisdom and solid judgement of
that renowned queen; with the little
or no advantage which she could
reap from so poor an artifice: All
this might astonish me; but I would
still reply, that the knavery
and folly of men are such common
phenomena, that I should rather
believe the most extraordinary events
to arise from their concurrence,
than admit of so signal a violation
of the laws of nature.
But should this miracle be
ascribed to any new system of religion;
men, in all ages, have been so much
imposed on by ridiculous stories
of that kind, that this very circumstance
would be a full proof of a
cheat, and sufficient, with all
men of sense, not only to make them
reject the fact, but even reject
it without farther examination.
Though the Being to whom the miracle
is ascribed, be, in this case,
Almighty, it does not, upon that
account, become a whit more probable;
since it is impossible for us to
know the attributes or actions of
such a Being, otherwise than from
the experience which we have of
his productions, in the usual course
of nature. This still reduces
us to past observation, and obliges
us to compare the instances of the
violation of truth in the testimony
of men, with those of the
violation of the laws of nature
by miracles, in order to judge which
of them is most likely and probable.
As the violations of truth are
more common in the testimony concerning
religious miracles, than in
that concerning any other matter
of fact; this must diminish very much
the authority of the former testimony,
and make us form a general
resolution, never to lend any attention
to it, with whatever
specious pretence it may be covered.
Lord Bacon seems to have embraced
the same principles of
reasoning. "We ought," says he,
"to make a collection or particular
history of all monsters and prodigious
births or productions, and in a
word of everything new, rare, and
extraordinary in nature. But this
must be done with the most severe
scrutiny, lest we depart from truth.
Above all, every relation must be
considered as suspicious, which
depends in any degree upon religion,
as the prodigies of Livy: And
no less so, everything that is to
be found in the writers of natural
magic or alchemy, or such authors,
who seem, all of them, to have an
unconquerable appetite for falsehood
and fable."*
* Novum Organum, II, aph.
29.
100. I am the better pleased
with the method of reasoning here
delivered, as I think it may serve
to confound those dangerous friends
or disguised enemies to the Christian
Religion, who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles of human
reason. Our most holy religion is
founded on Faith, not on reason;
and it is a sure method of exposing
it to put it to such a trial as
it is, by no means, fitted to
endure. To make this more evident,
let us examine those miracles,
related in scripture; and not to
lose ourselves in too wide a field,
let us confine ourselves to such
as we find in the Pentateuch, which
we shall examine, according to the
principles of these pretended
Christians, not as the word or testimony
of God himself, but as the
production of a mere human writer
and historian. Here then we are
first to consider a book, presented
to us by a barbarous and
ignorant people, written in an age
when they were still more
barbarous, and in all probability
long after the facts which it
relates, corroborated by no concurring
testimony, and resembling those
fabulous accounts, which every nation
gives of its origin. Upon
reading this book, we find it full
of prodigies and miracles. It gives
an account of a state of the world
and of human nature entirely
different from the present: Of our
fall from that state: Of the age of
man, extended to near a thousand
years: Of the destruction of the
world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary
choice of one people, as the
favourites of heaven; and that people
the countrymen of the author: Of
their deliverance from bondage by
prodigies the most astonishing
imaginable: I desire anyone to lay
his hand upon his heart, and
after a serious consideration declare,
whether he thinks that the
falsehood of such a book, supported
by such a testimony, would be more
extraordinary and miraculous than
all the miracles it relates; which
is, however, necessary to make it
be received, according to the
measures of probability above established.
101. What we have said of
miracles may be applied, without any
variation, to prophecies; and indeed,
all prophecies are real
miracles, and as such only, can
be admitted as proofs of any
revelation. If it did not exceed
the capacity of human nature to
foretell future events, it would
be absurd to employ any prophecy as
an argument for a divine mission
or authority from heaven. So that,
upon the whole, we may conclude,
that the Christian Religion not
only was at first attended with
miracles, but even at this day
cannot be believed by any reasonable
person without one. Mere reason
is insufficient to convince us of
its veracity: And whoever is moved
by Faith to assent to it, is conscious
of a continued miracle in his
own person, which subverts all the
principles of his understanding,
and gives him a determination to
believe what is most contrary to
custom and experience.
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